White Christmas in April: The Collapse of South Vietnam, 1975

Lee, J. Edward and Toby Haynsworth (eds.). White Christmas in April: The Collapse of South Vietnam, 1975. New York: Peter Lang Publisher, 1999. 256 pp.

This book consists of a series of interviews, held by the editors, with various individuals knowledgeable about the collapse of the Republic of Viet Nam. The editors claim, correctly, that the view they present "is not nearly as pessimistic, accusatory, narrow, or bitter as that offered by" others who have written on America's debacle in Asia. "At least in April [1975]," they aver, "we also saw sacrifice, compassion, and a successful mission [of withdrawal from the South] which saved the lives of over 100,000 endangered people." They do not tell us from where they derived this pollyannish view of the last days, nor are we informed as to the basis for the figure of 100,000 people saved.

They are certainly correct, however, when they write that "no one wanted to be the last person to die in the Vietnam War" And so, as the strains of Bing Crosby singing "White Christmas," flooded out over the air waves of Saigon to signal that the endtime had come, America launched "Frequent Wind," the operation to evacuate from Viet Nam as the forces of the northern Democratic Republic of Viet Nam closed in on the city. All was lost. Fifty-eight thousand Americans had died in vain. Perhaps well over 200,000 northern soldiers and 100,000 southern members of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had died in the conflict. Add to these the teeming thousands of civilians caught up in the conflict and crushed by it. Those casualty figures total well over one million lives slaughtered for no good purpose amidst the wrecking of a beautiful country and atrocities such as My Lai.

It is thus difficult for me to take seriously the editors plaint that Frequent Wind "had moments of gallantry which should make us all proud" (p. 5). Gallantry perhaps. Pride no.

The stories their twenty-seven interviewees tell are, for the most part, interesting. Yet is is tiresome to hear yet again from Alexander Haig, whose politics in those years helped him rise in rank from lieutenant colonel to full general in less than a year. The comments by Ed Pelosky are more rewarding , while those by CBS news chief in Saigon, Haney Howell, tug at my heart. General John Murray rightly describes his Pentagon bosses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as "four disinterested sadists" (p. 51). He described General Creighton Abrams, successor to General William Westmoreland, in terms that had been used by writers to portray General George Patton: "about half mad," "if not actually mad, was at least highly neurotic," "there had to be a screw loose somewhere" "Applying these comments . . . to Abrams would be right on the mark" (p. 53). What a dismal commentary!

We hear from others. From Homer Smith and William LeGro, from William Estep and George Esper and a host of lesser known people. One contributor was of particular interest to me: COL Stuart Herrington, with whom I became acquainted when as a lieutenant he was posted to the school where I served as professor, the University of South Florida in Tampa, as the first Professor of Military Science for a newly created ROTC unit. The author of two interesting books, he tells us how easily the U.S. could have saved many more Vietnamese during Frequent Wind if it had only been extended for another hour and a few more helicopter flights.

In sum, the chapters are uneven in their worth, but that nearly always happens in such a publication. There are some really worthwhile thoughts set forth here. While purchase of this book is not essential, it is recommended.

Cecil B. Currey University of South Florida

Copyright Association of Third World Studies, Inc. Spring 2003
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