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Industry: Email Alert RSS FeedConcreteness and relational effects on recall of adjective-noun pairs
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, Sep 2000 by Allan Paivio, Mustaq Khan, Ian Begg
Abstract Extending previous research on the problem, we studied the effects of concreteness and relatedness of adjective-noun pairs on free recall, cued recall, and memory integration. Two experiments varied the attributes in paired associates lists or sentences. Consistent with predictions from dual coding theory and prior results with noun-noun pairs, both experiments showed that the effects of concreteness were strong and independent of relatedness in free recall and cued recall. The generally positive effects of relatedness were absent in the case of free recall of sentences. The two attributes also had independent (additive) effects on integrative memory as measured by conditionalized free recall of pairs. Integration as measured by the increment from free to cued recall occurred consistently only when pairs were high in both concreteness and relatedness. Explanations focused on dual coding and relational-distinctiveness processing theories as well as task variables that affect integration measures.
This study further tested alternative hypotheses concerning the effects of concreteness and relational variables on free recall, cued recall, and measures of integrative recall. The theoretical and empirical issues were reviewed in detail by Paivio, Walsh, and Bons (1994). We summarize the pertinent aspects of that background and then present the rationale for the present research.
The alternative hypotheses and predictions were based on dual coding theory (e.g., Paivio, 1971, 1991) and Marschark and Hunt's (1989) relational/distinctiveness processing theory. Dual coding theory explains positive effects of word concreteness in target tasks primarily in terms of the following empirically supported assumptions: (a) nonverbal images are more likely to be aroused by concrete than abstract words; (b) the memory traces of the activated images are "stronger" than the verbal traces of the words themselves; (c) the image and verbal traces are mnemonically independent and additive; (d) concrete word pairs promote activation of compound images that function as integrated memory traces; and (e) the integrated image can be redintegrated by presentation of one pair member as a retrieval cue, thereby mediating response recall. The independence-additivity assumption accounts for most of the concreteness effect in free recall and some of the effect in cued recall. The imagery integration-redintegration hypothesis accounts for the findings that the concreteness effect is larger in cued recall than in free recall, and that concrete items are especially effective as retrieval cues. The integrative and retrieval functions of compound images define the conceptual peg hypothesis of imagery effects in paired associate learning, which we discuss further after describing Marschark and Hunt's alternative approach.
Marschark and Hunt (1989) proposed that the effects of concreteness on memory arise from relational and distinctive processing of items rather than imagery or dual coding mechanisms. Relational processing entails responding to word pairs or sentences on the basis of inter-item relational information inherent in the items (associative or semantic relations) or activated by experimental procedures (e.g., instructions to relate the items in some way). Distinctive processing entails responding to items on the basis of any information that distinguishes items from each other.
Marschark and Hunt reasoned that memory for response words from a list of pairs depends on the activation of both relational and distinctive information at encoding. Relational information that is reactivated at retrieval delineates a search set of word pairs, and distinctive information then permits discrimination of each target pair and response word from the set. Concreteness-induced imagery, though a possible source of both kinds of information, especially enhances distinctive processing. Therefore, given activation of the appropriate relational information, concrete items should be recalled better than abstract items because the former are distinctive. If relational processing is absent during encoding or retrieval, concreteness effects should be attenuated or eliminated (Marschark & Hunt, 1989, p. 711).
The above hypothesis implies that concreteness will interact with conditions that maximize or minimize relational processing during encoding or retrieval. The results of a series of experiments by Marschark and Hunt (1989) were generally consistent with the predictions. They were also interpreted to be inconsistent with dual coding theory on the grounds that the latter attributes concreteness effects to imagery as an additional memory code rather than to imagery-based distinctiveness in the context of relational processing.
Paivio et al. (1994) responded that relational and distinctiveness processing mechanisms do not in themselves distinguish the two theories because dual coding theory also assumes that imagery and verbal processes can affect memory by enhancing relational processing (e.g., in paired associate learning) or distinctiveness (e.g., in recognition memory) of items. The theories differ, however, in regard to two hypotheses that are relevant to concreteness effects on memory. One is the dual coding hypothesis that imaginal and verbal codes are mnemonically independent and, therefore, additive in their effects on item memory. This explanation was the focus of Marschark and Hunt's (1989) opposition to dual coding. The other important difference is that, whereas Marschark and Hunt proposed that concreteness effects depend on relational processing, Paivio et al. reasoned from an empirical and theoretical basis that concreteness and relational variables are independent in their effects on memory.