Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc

Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc, Graeme P. Herd and Jennifer D. P. Moroney, eds. Curzon and London: Routledge, 2003. 233 pp. $95.00, hardcover.

Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Block gives readers a stimulating glimpse of the fast-changing environment in what is termed the former Soviet Union (FSU). The compendium serves as a good comparative study of the regions and nations on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

The editors, Graeme P. Herd and Jennifer D. P. Moroney, have organized the book by three main regions-the Baltics, the C.I.S. (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine), and the C.I.S. periphery (Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia).

The FSU moniker should not really apply to the Baltic countries, as they technically and legally re-established their independence more than a decade ago. There should be no doubt that the Baltics, within these groupings, have aligned themselves most closely with the West. This is part geography, part politics, and part historical legacy.

The Baltic security politics section is divided into three chapters-"The Post-Prague Strategic Orientation of the Baltic States" by Adam Grissom, "Security: Lynchpin of Baltic Cooperation" by Mel Huang, and "Russia's Baltic Policy in an Era of EU integration" by Ingmar Oldberg. Grissom, who now works with RAND, is a former civil servant at the Department of Defense. Huang is a free-lance writer and researcher who has worked in many fields, from the Defense Academy of the U.K., to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oldberg is associate director of research at the Swedish Defense Research Institute.

In his overview of Baltic alignments, Grissom covers four phases of Baltic Security orientation in the post-Cold War era: independence (1988-91), internationalization (1991-94), European sponsorship (1994-97), and emphasis on Washington and Brussels (1997-2002). These are very convenient measurements and help trace how the Baltics came to be where they are today.

Grissom's assertion that "once again, neither Tallinn, nor Riga nor Vilnius had a vote" over NATO membership, as if it were thrust upon them, cannot be considered accurate. One recalls the phrase about East Berliners voting with their feet. The populations in these countries, to say nothing of the political leadership, knew that there was no other security alignment option.

There are other initial lapses in the chapter. The author portends of possible "deleterious consequences" for the Baltics and the region with a Nordic-Baltic security front upstaged by NATO. Also, there is the misguided impression that the Baltics were incorporated into the Tsarist empire only in the early nineteenth century-when it fact it was the eighteenth century.

The Tsars treated the Baltics as a buffer zone, but so did the Soviets. Besides the heavy militarization by the Soviets which, as Grissom writes, helped to create a subregional identity, a Baltic identity was bolstered by unified actions prior to the restoration of independence. It was sensible for the Baltic governments to keep strategic orientations among themselves close after 1991. From Washington's standpoint, too, it was more convenient to work on a joint approach with the Baltics.

The West's convenience in lumping the Baltics together certainly played a role in Baltic considerations for cooperation. Something must be said about the role of emigres in the West, particularly in the United States, who worked closely to achieve the common overriding goals of the restoration of independence and NATO membership.

The three countries together would certainly reap political benefits from this orientation. The Baltics have had perhaps their most influential supporters from Washington. This has been especially true during the past six years, as the United States supported the Baltic countries' goal of NATO membership, which will be formalized next spring. The U.S.-Baltic Charter helped to guide relations during this phase.

As they also joined the European Union, the Baltics benefited from a multitude of multilateral arrangements with the U.S. and the Baltics' neighbors in Europe. The United States developed the Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) in 1997 as an umbrella for their programs of cooperation. NEI is currently evolving into the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE). The Europeans also debuted a new program in 1997 called the Northern Dimension (ND). NEI and ND overlapped to some degree, but the Europeans were in a better and closer position to deal with Baltic soft security initiatives on a more substantial level.

The e-PINE program should help the United States and the Baltics become closer allies with the Nordic countries. There are other multilateral forums in which these parties are at the same table, so e-PINE needs to develop its own niche. Questions abound over how U.S. funding will be found for programs in an era of inflated deficits. It will be interesting to see how the United States can sustain its influence in this capacity.