No Easy Row for a Russian to Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991

Matusevich, Maxim. No Easy Row for a Russian to Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960-1991. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003.

The traditional narrative of the Cold War focuses on the ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Typically, all mention of Third World nations is that of a bystander, with no control in the conflict between East and West. In constructing this relationship all power and control is given to the United States and the Soviet Union. The interests of the Third World nations are subordinated to the greater good of their superpower patron. The countries are not thought to have any ability to make decisions based on their own national interests. Instead, they are thought to be guided by the ideological factors of capitalism or socialism; there is no other option.

In No Easy Row for a Russian to Hoe, Maxim Matusevich states that the traditional view of Cold War rivalry is insufficient to explain African, particularly Nigerian, actions during this time. The conventional outlook on the Cold War is too narrow as it does not account for any agency in the Third World. The view of the Third World on the periphery has been perpetuated by scholars in both the United States and the Soviet Union. In reality, Nigeria was influenced not by the Cold War rhetoric of capitalism or Socialism, but saw the time period as an opportunity to exploit and manipulate the fears and desires of the United States and the Soviet Union. Matusevich states that "contrary to a widely accepted belief, Third World countries did not necessarily remain on the periphery of global confrontation; rather they actively engaged the superpowers, taking full advantage of their idiosyncrasies, weaknesses, and ambitions" (p. 9). Using this pragmatic approach, as opposed to the more traditional ideological approach, Matusevich examines the relationship between Nigeria and the Soviet Union from 1961-1990 to reassess the stereotypes of Third World participation. His conclusion is that Nigeria was realistic and used the rhetoric of the Cold War to exploit the superpowers for its own benefit. The Nigerian government was not helpless in the struggle between East and West.

How is Matusevich able to demonstrate this new outlook where others have not? He states that he was able to access sources that had been "previously unknown, unutilized, or simply inaccessible to the English-speaking scholar and public" (p. 9). His sources include newspaper and journal articles, official publications and documents from the United States, the Soviet Union, and Nigeria, and interviews with Nigerian officials. Traditional Cold War scholars would typically have only accessed Soviet and American documents. It is unlikely that they would have examined the Nigerian information as Nigerian involvement was viewed as negligible. Using all these sources is extremely effective as it offers an opportunity to give a more balanced view of the events. Additionally, the reader follows the events not from the typical Eurocentric view, but from the Nigerian perspective. This is critical as he is demonstrating that Nigerian actions were independent of the goals of the superpowers.

Marusevich uses a basic chronological structure that follows the Nigerian-Soviet relationship from 1960 until the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991. This basic framework effectively demonstrates how the Nigerian relationship with the Soviet government evolved over time and what circumstances prompted the Nigerian government to turn to the Soviets for assistance. The First Republic had been extremely cautious in its dealings with the Soviets for fear of interference. But when the Federal Government needed military aid during the Biafran War, which was not forthcoming from the United States, the Nigerian government made a utilitarian decision and turned to Russia for aid. This occurred not because the government had decided that socialism was the road to follow, but because it needed the weapons to defeat the secessionist state of Biafra.

Traditional studies of the Cold War see this time period as a battle between the United States and the Soviet Union for dominance in the Third World. The U.S. relationship is downplayed, yet this would seem to be an integral element of the Nigerian-Soviet relationship. While Matusevich shows the relationship between Nigeria and the Soviet Union as pragmatic, it is harder at times to discern the relationship with the United States. While his title does refer to just Nigerian-Soviet relations, his introduction encompasses both superpowers. Matusevich demonstrates that for Nigeria the Cold War was not a battle over ideology but one for aid and assistance in developing the nation, but the U.S. response is especially muted. This is highlighted in the section on the Biafran War. The United States was extremely concerned with Soviet encroachment in both the Congo and Angola and became actively involved either through the UN or through its proxies. It would therefore be logical to assume that the United States would be anxious about the Soviets making progress in influencing the Nigerian government, especially once military aid was given. Matusevich does not successfully resolve this issue. He states that Nigeria had always been cautious over Soviet motives and reassured the United States that the military acquisitions "[were] a straight commercial purchase for cash and had no overtones of ideology and alignment" (p. 137). While the Nigerian government might have known that they were using the Russians and had no other interest in Soviet involvement, it seems dubious that the Americans were not concerned with the increased cordiality between the two nations.

Another instance where greater detail would have supported his examples was with the construction of the steel plant at Ajaokuta. Matusevich states that the Nigerian government had turned to the Soviets for help in building the plant because the West had turned down the proposition. Using the Russians to finance the project is a prime example of Nigerian practicality during the Cold War. When the United States would not help finance the construction, Nigeria was quick to seek aid elsewhere. But he does not explain why they remained involved with the Soviets after problems arose. As early as 1979 Nigeria was not happy with Soviet technicians, the quality of the equipment coming from Russia, and the delays in construction. The question remaining unanswered is why did the government not threaten to stop Soviet aid and turn to Western aid? Nigeria had successively manipulated the Cold War rhetoric to its advantage up until this point. But Matusevich does not answer why the Nigerian government abandoned this tactic and threaten Soviet prestige in Africa by turning to the West for assistance.

Despite these drawbacks, No Easy Row to Hoe is an extremely informative book on Nigerian-Soviet relations. Matusevich effectively demonstrates that Nigeria was not on the periphery of Cold War relationships. This book illustrates how successful Nigeria was in manipulating Cold War rhetoric from an ideological base to a pragmatic one. Matusevich has created new avenues for future research to examine this relationship in more detail. Additionally, he asks important questions about the future of Nigeria and other Third World nations now that the Cold War is over. By playing on Western fears of communism and losing commercial enterprises, Nigeria was able to secure aid from the West. Now with the collapse of the Soviet empire, Africa is competing for aid with Eastern Europe and Russia. Will Africans be able to manipulate the international system and gain benefits for themselves or will they remain marginalized? Matusevich's book sets the stage for further investigation into this and other questions about Africa's participation in the post-Cold War global economy.

Elizabeth Day University of Texas at Austin

Copyright Association of Third World Studies, Inc. Spring 2005
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved