Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict

Callahan, David. Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1998. 273 pp.

This volume, sponsored by The Twentieth Century Fund, provides much in the way of background to the rapidly changing nature of internationalism, since the fall of communism. David Callahan offers the reader an interesting perspective of the American experience of the last thirty years in dealing with the dilemma of ethnic conflict. In doing so, he provides both a vivid depiction of Washington's failed policies and its fortuitous successes. His recommendations attempt to predict and, therefore, prevent ethnic and sectarian violence. As a consequence, they pose a challenge to opponents of internationalism. Arresting the ideological divide, Callahan succeeds admirably in making a compelling case for building consistency into the American diplomatic effort in approaching intractable problems of ethnic conflict.

The introduction provides a glimpse of recent ethnic violence and its popular characterization as the "new tribalism" of the future, the political thinking of "failed ideas" and the need for a United States strategy, even though "Washington has had a few successes in handling ethnic conflicts." Here, too, Callahan wisely utilizes Anthony D. Smith's work in defining ethnic conflict. It gives his analysis the requisite clarity in understanding the challenges American diplomacy faces in the next century. For Callahan, "the United States will never be able to end these wars entirely, but it can help to make them less common and, when they do occur, to reduce both their intensity and their duration."

The book is organized into five chapters. Chapter one surveys contemporary struggles for self-determination with their conflicting claims and United States interests. To be sure, not all ethnic violence is a struggle for self-determination. However, the formidable political question confronting U.S. policymakers is this: "Does supporting some secessionist movements risk setting off a dangerous chain reaction of ethnic dominoes falling throughout the world?"

Chapter two focuses on prediction. Callahan examines factors of state repression (the Kurds in Turkey, Albanians in Kosovo, and Tamils in Sri Lanka, among others) and the historical context of ethnic violence. He views success and failure in prediction as linked directly to levels of U.S. interest with "the combination of indifference and unfamiliarity . . . a recipe for surprise when crises occur." Although prediction is limited (or flawed, as anti-interventionists argue), what happens too frequently are predictions of impending crises that have been identified at a lower level of government going unrecognized at a higher level by officials who are preoccupied with other issues. In this matter, Callahan considers knowledge and historical ties, distractions, diplomatic reporting, media and intelligence capabilities as factors, and concludes that the primary obstacle to better prediction of ethnic conflict "is not a lack of resources or of public support but the need to retarget existing resources and learn to pay attention to an unfamiliar cacophony of warning signals." Examples of failure include Nigeria, East Pakistan, Burundi in 1972 and 1988, Yugoslavia, Turkish Kurdistan, Chechnya and Rwanda. The occasional success in prevention is attributed to the focusing of significant resources over a long period of time. The Baltic states are cited as examples, as is Burundi in 1993-1994 and--before the latest disaster in Yugoslavia--Kosovo. The 1999 war with Serbia, however, seemingly tempers any ex post facto calculus for prediction.

Chapter four focuses on intervention defined by the author "as actions ranging from diplomacy to the use of force. ... The efficacy of diplomatic pressure and condemnation, sanctions, war crime indictments, mediation, humanitarian, and the use of force are examined. Each is assessed against the record of the last thirty years, with diplomacy considered the first line of defense and military intervention the last resort, and "always unpredictable, no matter how well conceived and executed."

In his concluding chapter, "Toward the Future," Callahan stresses the empowerment of the United Nations and regional organizations both governmental and non-governmental. In the latter case, he recommends that greater contacts be cultivated even though NGOs often criticize U.S. policy for its inconsistency regarding human rights, its irresponsibilities in arms sales, and its slow responses to refugee crises. The objective, he argues, is to negotiate stability by building a "global collective-security order" that would go beyond enhancing capacities to manage ethnic conflicts.

In this book, David Callahan combines incisive analysis with sensible recommendations that prove to be an invaluable guide in understanding American power, global ethnic conflict and unwinnable wars. It's a pity President Clinton did not read it and heed its recommendations, since it should command particular attention beyond the academy.