John Calvin and the Will: A Critique and Corrective

John Calvin and the Will: A Critique and Corrective. By Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. Foreword by Richard A. Muller. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997, 162 pp., $12.99.

The author of this study on Calvin and the will, a time-honored debate in the history of Christian doctrine, presents in rather short space an engaging discussion of the subject (including a historical overview). After an introductory chapter on the powers of the soul respecting both the intellect and the will, Hoitenga takes up the question of the primacy of the one to the other. He then moves to his critical analysis of Calvin's views, before offering his own proposal for reformulation. The author's criticism of Calvin extends to the Reformed theological tradition as a whole.

Fundamentally, Hoitenga detects a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies in Calvin's thought, leading him to conclude that Calvin's understanding of the will is mistaken and in dire need of correction. However challenging and provocative his argument, at the end of the day Hoitenga fails to achieve his stated goal. The author has not convinced this reader of any fatal flaw in Calvin's theologizing (or in the Reformed tradition more generally). The remarks which follow come from one who is a theologian, not a philosopher. But Hoitenga's venture into the arena of theological debate invites such response. Calvin himself as Hoitenga correctly observes, was highly suspect of philosophy, specifically its tendency toward speculation. Rightly or wrongly, Calvin was prone to equate philosophy with human speculation. I share Calvin's reservation and the comments below will provide some indication why I do so. If any correction is to be made concerning the Calvinist doctrine of (free) will, it is to be made along the lines of clarification and redefinition of terms.

Our author asks: how can one say that since Adam's fall into sin the will has become enslaved and at the same time meaningfully uphold genuine accountability for human words and actions? To argue that the will is incapable of choosing between good and evil-that the will is inclined only to sin (as Calvin and Reformed theology understand Scripture to teach)-suggests to Hoitenga that fallen humanity cannot do good of any kind. The logic of Calvinistic doctrine is contradictory and incoherent, or so Hoitenga would have us think. We are warned: "If Reformed theologians remain preoccupied with expositing, restating, or reinterpreting Calvin, they will accomplish little in the way of providing a consistent development of his thought" (p. 20). Well now, Hoitenga has my complete attention!

According to our provocateur, Calvin's mistake is philosophical, not theological. Had Calvin given closer attention to the philosophical ramifications of his theologizing (that is, had he overcome his unwarranted reservation concerning philosophy), he would have been spared of obvious, glaring error. Following Calvin on the fallen will, reasons Hoitenga, we are left "with a will that is even less than a shadow of its created nature. On Calvin's view, the fall not only corrupts the will, but nearly destroys it" (pp. 69-70). As a consequence, Calvin "cannot explain adequately the moral character of human action in that state, when it still makes choices between good and evil" (p. 70).

As suggested above, the flaw in thinking concerning the will and its powers of choice lies chiefly in Hoitenga, not in Calvin and his successors. But having said that, a case nevertheless can be made against certain scholastic hangovers found in Protestant/ Reformed orthodoxy. The culprit here is the speculative dichotomy between nature and grace descriptive of the human constitution in both the state of creation and the state of redemption; it is a psycho-philosophical dualism, a vestige of medieval scholasticism. The speculators confusingly distinguish between God-given natural gifts, on the one hand, and supernatural gifts, on the other. Hoitenga admits: "In fact, these latter terms are misleading, since both the natural and supernatural gifts originate in God, who as creator of the natural gifts is no less supernatural with respect to them than he is with respect to the supernatural gifts of his grace" (p. 71). In spite of this stricture, Hoitenga vigorously maintains the nature/grace dualism in his formulation of the creaturely powers of the soul, fallen and unfallen. And yet he also opposes explicitly any suggestion of "a realm of `pure nature' in human life, thought, and action that is essentially unimpaired and unaffected by the restoration of faith and true piety in a converted human being." He acknowledges: "I agree with the long-standing Protestant objection to a `two-story' relationship between nature and grace" (p. 113).

Here's the point: in the original state of nature (or state of integrity) Adam's "gifts," comprising just so many aspects of his creaturely constitution, were supernaturally bestowed; his very creation as God's image-bearer is expressive of the Creator's goodness, not of his "grace" (the saving benefits applied by the Spirit of Christ to undeserving sinners, those elected from among fallen humankind since the foundation of the world). Contrary to Hoitenga's view, salvation is not the addition of (irresistable) grace to nature, fallen and corrupted though nature had become through Adam's transgression. Had Adam successfully passed probation, the reward of eternal life (and the gift of immutability) would not have been a reward of "grace." Grace is a distinctively soteric category. Accordingly, Hoitenga is incorrect in saying that the supernatural gifts of "grace" were lost through Adam's fall. Hoitenga's logic would seemingly call into question the "fairness" of the divine imputation of Adam's sin and inherited depravity, including the will's bondage to sin. (Implicit in Hoitenga's discussion here is the essential Reformed doctrine of the covenant of works.)