Meaning, intention, and application: Speech act theory in the hermeneutics of Francis Watson and Kevin J. Vanhoozer
Trinity Journal, Fall 2002 by Blue, Scott A
are neither new acts nor unintended effects, but rather applications of the originally intended meaning. I would be happier to speak of meaning in terms of the author's intended meaning and of significance in terms of the author's extended meaning.111
VI. CONCLUSION
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While both Watson and Vanhoozer incorporate speech act theory into their hermeneutical programs, they disregard one important area in their discussions. Neither writer adequately demonstrates how speech act theory can be practically included in the process of interpretation. Watson does analyze texts within his biblical theological approach, but does not explicitly show any difference that speech act theory makes in his interpretations. Vanhoozer lays a literalist hermeneutical foundation for interpretation, but, again, fails to demonstrate how speech act principles are to be practiced within that framework. This is not to say that speech act theory has no practical implications.112 Yet, if Watson and Vanhoozer view language as a communicative act so highly, each should in some way move beyond its theoretical moorings to its application in the hermeneutical process.
I return to the beginning question of whether Watson and Vanhoozer should be considered allies or competitors within the field of hermeneutics. I have demonstrated that the similarities of their hermeneutical programs are evident. They stand together against a postmodernist systematic program that considers the author irrelevant and determinate meaning a myth. They move the hermeneutical discussion of authorial intent beyond a linguistic approach, in my opinion, in order to change the field of debate with postmodern literary critics and their "descriptive fallacy." Both Watson and Vanhoozer include as foundational the notion that writing, like speaking, is a communicative act which cannot be divorced from its origin in the intent of the author. Finally, they assert that there is indeed a distinction between a text's meaning and its significance. These similarities make clear that Watson and Vanhoozer are not on opposite sides of the hermeneutical divide.
There are, however, noted differences in their approaches that prevent any consideration that they are complete allies. The most apparent indicator of their differences is that they advocate two distinct hermeneutical programs. On the surface, Watson's emphasis on biblical theology and Vanhoozer's Trinitarian hermeneutics seem somewhat compatible, but there are crucial differences. Likewise, although both use speech act theory to recover the author's intent and the determinacy of meaning, Vanhoozer's is a more expanded treatment, including adding the interlocutionary aspect of language as a communicative act. Furthermore, Watson includes perlocutionary effects within the purview of authorial intention, while Vanhoozer is steadfast in claiming that the author's meaning is found in the illocutionary act alone. Finally, although each attempts to maintain a Hirschian distinction between meaning and significance, Watson is more open to Hirsch's expansion of his earlier discussion of their distinction. It seems best, therefore, to consider Watson and Vanhoozer "friendly competitors" on the playing field of hermeneutics. United against their opposition, they nevertheless differ in their methodologies.