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Meaning, intention, and application: Speech act theory in the hermeneutics of Francis Watson and Kevin J. Vanhoozer

Trinity Journal,  Fall 2002  by Blue, Scott A

<< Page 1  Continued from page 12.  Previous | Next

Leschert concludes that Hirsch's "hermeneutical developments" are "perfectly consistent with his former theory. In fact, they actually strengthen it by dealing with situations that his earlier book did not address."101

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Hirsch himself explicitly revises his previous distinction between meaning and significance in two articles. In "Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted," although he claims still to hold his previous analysis of a difference between meaning as a "self-- identical schema whose boundaries are determined by an original speech event" and significance as a "relationship drawn between that self-identical meaning and something, anything, else," he states it needs elaboration.102 There are instances where an author specifically intends for his speech event to be open-ended, not fixed within its original context. Speaking is such a future-directed intention, because "the present of the listener will come after the present of the speaker."103 The result is a domain of fixity and one of variability. Purpose is that which is fixed, but the future fulfillments are that which is variable.104 The result is an amending of his previous distinction between meaning and significance by rejecting his

earlier claim that future applications of meaning, each being different, must belong to the domain of significance. That was wrong, because different applications do not necessarily lie outside the boundaries of meaning.105

Hirsch further provides a qualified and deepened proposal of his arguments expressed in his earlier work in "Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory." Maintaining a broad sense of authorial intention, he argues for an allegorical element in determining meaning. Allegory, or the ability to find "meanings that neither the original author nor the original audience would have directly construed," is an implicit feature "in the interpretation of all writings that are intended to apply across time - the kinds of writings, that is, that are found in literature, law, and religion."106 Hirsch prefers an Augustinian "third way," which takes into consideration unforeseen contemporary meanings controlled by the principle of authorial intention.107 His openness to allegorical interpretation is, however, not a blank-sheet for relativism: "An allegory is wrong if it is untrue to the spirit of the original intent. Interpretation must always go beyond the writer's letter, but never beyond the writer's spirit."108

Thiselton argues that Hirsch's theories need to be updated in light of "the complexity of the issues formulated in post-Gadamarian theory."109 This update, Thiselton asserts, should include discussion of the author's intention in light of theories which view texts as communicative acts.110 The difference between Watson's and Vanhoozer's discussion of significance and its distinction from meaning, in my opinion, is the difference between Watson answering Thiselton's challenge and Vanhoozer preferring to maintain a more concrete dichotomy between the two concepts. Watson more inclusively defines authorial intent in terms of verbal meaning, along with its illocutionary and perlocutionary effects; notes that this intent opens the door for unforeseen consequences which are outside of the author's control; and allows the world, including postmodern critics and feminist theologians, to shape biblical interpretation. If one favors Hirsch's extended description of meaning including, in certain circumstances, effects which the author could not have anticipated, he or she would find no fault in Watson's approach to the meaning/significance question. Obviously, Vanhoozer takes a stricter approach. By rejecting any perlocutionary effect within the realm of meaning, he conscientiously rejects Hirsch's later discussions regarding meaning and significance. After acknowledging Hirsch's modifications, Vanhoozer states that Hirsch's allegories