GATHERING THE SCATTERED BODY OF MILTON'S AREOPAGITICA

The opposition between form and expression in the theological writings is between one type of content and another, between one type of reasoning and another. The theological writings probably do illustrate what Milton sees as examples of books falling short in their high calling to be reasoning agents. This has nothing whatsoever to do with Milton's argument in the Areopagitica, however - nothing to do with his ontology of books. The phrase "external form" would be, in the Areopagitica, applied to a book as a physical object, and set in opposition to a book as a reasoning agent (a phrase that refers to the content of books). Fish's examples from the theological writings illustrate a dichotomy between good reasoning and bad, not between a book as a reasoning agent and a book as a physical object. The idea of external form as used in the Areopagitica could not possibly be relevant to the theological writings either. As physical objects set prayers are no different from a "free and unimpos'd expression," as physical objects essays that rigorously follow rules of composition are no different from essays that exhibit natural eloquence. In both cases they are composed of speech or of ink on paper.

Even Fish's effective humor, "Avenge O Lord thy slaughtered books," hinges upon a convincing misreading of Milton. Fish's misreading is convincing in that it is indeed representative of Milton's argument at one point - Milton does seem to speak as if killing a book is something like killing a man. It is a misreading in that Fish misses the obvious by ignoring relevant historical context in the form of the philosophy of human nature current in Milton's day. As a result, he misses the importance of books as physical objects: books are not mere objects any more than people are, as Milton argues from beginning to end, "For books are not absolutely dead things, but doe contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are" (Patrides 200). A book as an object is important because it is the repository of reason. Notice that Milton says a "potencie of life" is contained in books, and is as active as a human soul itself. In the same way that there is a potency of life in a human soul, a soul admittedly contained within a human body which is, after all, only an object, there is a potency of life contained in objects known as books as well. Actions committed against the object are meaningful in that they restrain the potency contained within the object. What is done to a book as an object affects the ideas contained within it, and therein lies the real crime.

Fish moves on from the theological writings to a direct look at the Areopagitica itself asserting, of course, that Milton tears down his previous arguments with later ones. His reading of Milton's argument seeks to render books ineffectual: "In short, the argument against licensing, which has always been read as an argument for books, is really an argument that renders books beside the point ... by denying their potency in one direction, Milton necessarily denies their potency in the other" ("Driving" 236). Fish's misreading here hinges upon the word "necessarily." Milton does argue that licensing will only remove the objects of lust, not lust from the human heart. A book as an "object of lust," an agent promoting lust, is a mere object like any other, and is neither more nor less efficacious in promoting lust than any other object, because the problem with human lust resides in people, not the objects to which their lust attaches itself. But Fish won't allow Milton to have it just one way. If books can't promote lust, they somehow "necessarily" can't promote virtue either, so are irrelevant (and hardly worthy of the high ontological status afforded them) supposedly because they are, after all, only objects ("Driving" 238).