Command failures

Army,  Mar 2003  by Ossad, Steven L

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A few days after Harmon went back to command 2nd Armored, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's tough-minded Chief of Staff, also visited II Corps HQ. By that time, Fredendall's command was "a tangled skein of misunderstanding, duplication of effort, overlapping responsibility and consequential muddle." Smith was equally disgusted with what he observed, leading Bradley to observe that Ike's deputy believed Fredendall to be, "incompetent or crazy or both." At this point it is difficult to see why the Supreme Commander had hesitated at all. He knew full well what was required. In a letter to his CGSS classmate and study partner, Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow, he laid out the commander's imperative for dealing with just such a situation:

Officers that fail ... must be ruthlessly weeded out. Considerations of friendship, family, kindliness and nice personality have nothing whatsoever to do with the problem...you must be tough [and get rid of the] lazy, the slothful, the indifferent or the complacent.

In addition to the potential negative reaction from fellow officers-especially Marshall and McNair-he had complicated the situation by his own public sponsorship. In addition to his earlier public praise, he had written two letters during the battle (one as recently as March 2) commending Fredendall for his "stout-hearted leadership" and stating, "you have proved your right to command a separate and fairly large American force on the battlefield." He undoubtedly intended to stiffen Fredendall's resolve in the middle of a fight, but reports of plummeting morale in II Corps and the parade of men he trusted-including Truscott, Harmon, Bedell Smith and Alexander-castigating Fredendall's leadership, finally left him no choice. The anti-British comments, the loss of confidence of his subordinates, Eisenhower's own experience (as well as that of other superior officers), the scandalous embarrassment of the command post and Fredendall's tactical failures in the field had finally moved Eisenhower to a decision.

On March 5, he visited Tebessa once more for a commander's conference. Bradley, whose presence as Ike's "eyes and ears" had already alienated Fredendall, was not informed of the visit and had to be summoned. During a break, the two classmates and friends went out to the porch. Ike went straight to the heart of the matter:

"What do you think of the command here?" "It's pretty bad. I've talked to all the division commanders. To a man they've lost confidence in Fredendall as the corps commander."

"Thanks Brad. You've confirmed what I thought was wrong. As a matter of fact I've already ordered Patton up from Rabat. He'll report in tomorrow to take command of II Corps."

The next day, Patton, took over. Ike offered some advice:

You must not retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do the job ... This matter frequently calls for more courage than any other thing you will have to do, but I expect you to be perfectly cold-blooded about it.