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Command failures
Army, Mar 2003 by Ossad, Steven L
As the battle was reaching its climax, on February 20, Ike summoned Maj. Gen. Ernest Harmon, CG, 2nd Armored Division, a tough, profane, no-nonsense cavalryman and armor expert, to his headquarters and explained the situation. Harmon was to relieve either Fredendall as CG, II Corps, or Ward as CG, 1st Armored Division. Harmon, true to his reputation and surprising even himself, blurted out to the commanding general, "Well, make up your mind, Ike, I can't do both." Eisenhower replied:
That's right, but right now I don't know what is to be done down there. I'm going to send you as deputy corps commander. Your first job is to do the best you can to help Fredendall to restore the situation. Then you will report directly to me whether you should relieve Ward or Fredendall.
After arriving at II Corps HQ, Harmon was handed a note from Fredendall-who then went to sleep-authorizing him to take charge of the battle. The tough tank commander went to the front where he met with Ward and other 1st Division officers, issued orders and, after the situation had stabilized with the Germans in retreat, returned on February 28 to Eisenhower's headquarters. He was completely disgusted with Fredendall and did not try to hide or temper his opinion. Suggesting that "the German had a few tricks left up his sleeve," and that Fredendall would be unable to cope, his message was simple:
This is Rommel, Ike, and tank warfare at its latest, way above poor Fredendall's head. ... Ward is all bushed, and besides he is hopping mad at Fredendall for letting Anderson disperse his division.
He went further, adding that if Fredendall remained in command, there was a danger that II Corps "might actually disintegrate." His more colorful assessments, published after the war, were more caustic. He described Fredendall as "no damn good," and had suggested that Ike "ought to get rid of him." He even intimated that Fredendall was drunk after celebrating the initial German withdrawal from Kasserine, although Fredendall claimed that he was simply "groggy" from lack of sleep. Harmon also described total confusion in the command post and, in a postwar interview with the historian of the 1st Armored Division, pulled no punches, calling Fredendall "a common low son of a bitch," who was unsuited to command. Patton's diary of March 2, 1943, describes a conversation in which Harmon labeled Fredendall, "a moral and physical coward."
Although in his postwar memoir Eisenhower did not even mention Harmon's mission, it may have finally convinced him to relieve Fredendall. Ike first offered the command to Harmon, who, in spite of his ambition to command a Corps, turned it down for ethical reasons; it would have been wrong to take the job of a man he had just excoriated and recommended for relief. Harmon suggested Patton. Before finally acting, Eisenhower offered command to his one time deputy, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, then commanding Fifth Army, who declined as he viewed the offer as a demotion. Eisenhower was not happy with that response.
