Victory myths and the battle of Tannenberg

Knowing the source of the anecdote, we can now speculate on its significance. The anecdote steadied the nerves of the German officers, and they then readily grasped the significance of the other, more accurate information they had at their disposal. If they had not believed in the false anecdote, they might not have used the other information properly. We infer this from how badly stressed Hoffmann and Ludendorff were at the beginning of the battle. Several times they seriously reconsidered their position, wondering if they were in a position of great strength or a position of great weakness (Evans: 122; Showalter:240). If Rennenkampf was already coming to Samsonov's aid, the Germans would be outflanked and outnumbered and would be unable to withdraw all of their forces in time to avoid an overwhelming defeat. However, if Rennenkampf harbored a grudge against Samsonov as Hoffmann said, the Germans had a window of opportunity. As the German officers had based their view of the world and their self-confidence on the value-relation that they must be able to win a two-front war, seeing this false opportunity gave them the means to make use of the real opportunity at their disposal. Believing the false statement steadied their view of the world and helped them see things as they really were. As Nietzsche once mentioned, both truth and lies have their uses, and sometimes people need a little illusion in order to function (Nietzsche 1979:93). First, the anecdote steadied the nerves of the German officers and decreased their stress. Second, it provided positive imagery. Third, it restored the stability of their cognitive assumptions and value-relations through which they perceived their circumstances.

When we understand the significance of the Battle of Tannenberg, we can see how the events were matched with corresponding elements of the subsequent propaganda myth. The German victory had to be explained as something more than a product of the mistakes of the Russians or dumb luck. The victory had to be explained to soothe rattled nerves and to deny that the beliefs of the German officers were ever challenged; it had to be explained as a product of things over which Germans had control or were intrinsic to their character: their staff planning, training, bravery, and foresight. No part of the myth of the battle which propelled Hindenburg and Ludendorff into historical prominence ever suggested that the Germans won due to luck, insubordination, or stupidity. The monument of Tannenberg and the official propaganda version emphasized the unity of the German people, the brilliance of German generals, and the cultural and racial superiority of the German people. The battle had exposed German disunity and incompetence at the highest levels of the German army, and had shaken German prejudices in their own superiority.

When we look at the military myths of other countries, we see a consistent pattern of explanations that are at odds with the historical facts. Victories in faith-based societies are usually explained as products of divine will. Such examples include Japan's deliverance from the Mongols through the Kamikaze, the victory of the Arabs over the Byzantines in 636 at the Jarmuk River, and the Byzantine's successful defence of their immensely fortified capital Constantinople with Greek Fire in 678 and 718. The Japanese believed that they were saved by a divine wind, not by an aberrant weather front. In the Old Testament, the Hebrews attributed their defeats to their sins and their victories to their faith. It is unfortunate that no philosopher of history ever dared to suggest that a people may have gained a victory through their vices. Similarly, the defeated will also usually have to explain their defeat as products of their own actions, betrayal, overwhelming odds, and their moral failure in the eyes of the divine, or risk giving up their autonomy and identity. In cases where defeat was ascribed to the virtues of the victors by the defeated, members of the defeated group usually joined the victors or otherwise did not oppose assimilation.