Prosecuting Raskolnikov: a literary and legal look at "consciousness of guilt" evidence

Porfiry does, however, confront Raskolnikov later in the novel, directly and dramatically telling him that he knows that he murdered the old woman and her sister:

   "Who was the murderer?" he repeated, as though he could not believe
   his own ears. "But it was you, Rodion Romanovich! (45) You murdered
   them!" he went on, almost in a whisper, but his voice was full of
   conviction.

   Raskolnikov sprang up from the sofa, stood still for a few seconds,
   and sat down again without a word. His whole face twitched
   compulsively.

   "Your lip is trembling again, as it always does," murmured Porfiry
   Petrovich almost sympathetically. "I don't think you quite
   understand me, Rodion Romanovich," he added after a short pause;
   "That is why you are so thunderstruck. I came on purpose to tell you
   everything, and bring everything out into the open."

   "It was not I who murdered her," whispered Raskolnikov, like a
   frightened small child caught redhanded in some misdeed. (46)

Obviously, when Raskolnikov denies that he murdered the two women, he is lying. This lie, however, is not one in which Raskolnikov fabricates details or invents new facts in order to divert inquiry into his wrongdoing. Rather, unlike the statement Raskolnikov gave to Ilya Petrovich, his statement to Porfiry is a general denial of guilt.

The law recognizes that, "unlike a false explanation or alibi given by a suspect when he is first confronted with a crime, his general denial of guilt does not demonstrate any consciousness of guilt." (47) Therefore, in merely denying that he was the one responsible, Raskolnikov does not give any evidence that can be used to prove his consciousness of guilt. In giving a false alibi to Ilya Petrovich, however, Raskolnikov does provide evidence admissible to prove his consciousness of guilt.

IV. Fleeing the Scene

In 1896, the United States Supreme Court quoted the Circuit Court for the Western District of Arkansas as informing jurors of the following concerning an individual's flight:

   [T]he law recognizes another proposition as true, and it is, that
   'The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold
   as a lion.' That is a self-evident proposition that has been
   recognized so often by mankind that we can take it as an axiom and
   apply it in this case. Therefore, the law says that if after a man
   kills another that he undertakes to fly, if he becomes a fugitive
   from justice, either by hiding in the jurisdiction, watching out to
   keep out of the way of the officers, or of going into the Osage
   country out of the jurisdiction, that you have a right to take that
   fact into consideration, because it is a fact that does not
   usually characterize an innocent act. (48)

Though the Supreme Court found fault with this rather partisan instruction, (49) the text does articulate, even if a bit too strongly, the fundamental rationale behind the admissibility of evidence of flight.