International bounty hunters for war criminals: privatizing the enforcement of justice

Air Force Law Review,  Wntr, 2001  by Christopher M. Supernor

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Both the United States and NATO were reluctant to use military forces in Bosnia to hunt for indicted war criminals in Bosnia. [85] NATO policy was to arrest indicted war criminals only if they were encountered in the course of normal operations. [86] The Pentagon insisted that the arrest of suspected war criminals was the responsibility of local law enforcement or political authorities. [87] The real reason for the military's reluctance was that any aggressive effort on their part to hunt indicted war criminals would jeopardize the negotiated peace. [88]

The UNSC could employ other enforcement sanctions besides authorizing a military invasion to compel the extradition of an indicted war criminal. However, the use of economic and political enforcement sanctions have proven ineffective at compelling a non-cooperative State to render custody of an international fugitive. In November 1999, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions against Afghanistan for harboring Bin Laden after he was indicted on United States criminal charges for masterminding the United States 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. [89] The UNSC ordered all States to freeze Afghanistan government assets and banned all flights to Afghanistan. [90] However, to date, the UNSC enforcement sanctions have not convinced Afghanistan to hand over Bin Laden. [91]

As the interest in prosecuting war criminals grows so to will the need for international bounty hunters. Although States are obligated under international law to cooperate with the prosecution of war criminals, far too frequently States are unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligation. The use of extradition treaties, military forces, and sanctions by the UNSC have, often proved to be ineffective tools for obtaining custody of suspected war criminals. If the international community is truly interested in prosecuting war crimes, then it needs to find effective legal alternatives for obtaining custody over fugitives. Establishing an international police force or authorizing international bounty hunters could provide the international community with an effective means to bring war criminals to justice.

IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BOUNTY HUNTERS

The UNSC could consider creating a permanent international police force as opposed to relying on private international bounty hunters. Although the UN does not have a permanent standing international police force, the UN frequently creates ad hoc international police forces to assist with particular peace operations. In 1998, approximately 3,000 civilian police officers were engaged in peace promoting missions throughout the world. [92] The capabilities of United Nation civilian police officers do not go much beyond traditional monitoring, training, or advisory tasks, however. [93] United Nation civilian police officers can not substitute as law enforcement for a failed State. [94] In a host nation with a functioning government, UN police officers can not operate without the cooperation of the host nation's government and law enforcement officers. The UN sends civilian police officers to rebuild and reform a host State's police force, not to perform law enforcement. The ad hoc United Nation civilian police fo rces that have been used in the past are incapable of capturing indicted war criminals in an uncooperative State. If the UN wanted an international police force to apprehend indicted war criminals, it would need to create a permanent standing police force. Such a force would need to be heavily armed and be prepared to enter a foreign State with armed force. A permanent international police force capable of arresting fugitive war criminals from rogue States might more closely resemble a military force than a civilian police force.