International bounty hunters for war criminals: privatizing the enforcement of justice

Air Force Law Review,  Wntr, 2001  by Christopher M. Supernor

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International bounty hunters would also benefit from the vast expanse of information available on the Internet. A website devoted to the most recent sightings of individuals who are indicted by the ICTY already exists. [154] Private bounty hunters are already responsible for capturing two of the war criminals indicted by the ICTY. [155] Additionally, States would not be precluded from helping private international bounty hunters. A State could assist an international bounty hunter by providing intelligence, equipment, training, and transportation.

While international bounty hunters may not be able to arrest every indicted war criminal, the UNSC can reasonably expect international bounty hunters to capture indicted war criminals given the examples of domestic bounty hunters, the successful efforts of private parties at locating Nazi war criminals, and the possibility of State assistance. Whether motivated by justice, financial gain, or other self-serving goals, private parties are in an excellent position to contribute effectively to the apprehension of indicted war criminals if given the opportunity.

IX. CONCLUSION

Increasing the number of available forums to prosecute war criminals will not serve the interests of justice if the international community lacks the ability to locate and arrest indicted war criminals. There is no international police force to hunt and apprehend war criminals. Extradition treaties, the use of military forces, and UNSC economic sanctions are often ineffective means for obtaining custody of war criminals. If the UNSC wishes the ICTY and ICTR to fulfill its intended role of promoting international peace then the UNSC must find ways to forcefully bring indicted war criminals to trial.

The UNSC could lawfully authorize a multinational military force to use all necessary means to apprehend an indicted war criminal. However, the use of military forces could trigger a widespread-armed conflict. Furthermore, using military forces, which are engaged in peace-keeping, to hunt for war criminals would compromise their neutrality and potentially destabilize a negotiated peace. In many cases, the use of international bounty hunters to apprehend an indicted war criminal would be a more effective alternative than the use of military forces.

Private international bounty hunters will obviously not be concerned about the political ramifications of their actions. Nonetheless, an international bounty hunter is more likely to capture an indicted war criminal peacefully than is a military force. An international bounty hunter can not capture an indicted war criminal by waging a war against a State's military or police force, but must apprehend an indicted war criminal by stealth and surprise and with a minimal amount of force. Further, an international bounty hunter will carefully limit his use of force against an indicted war criminal because the former will not be paid if the latter dies. And, an international bounty hunter will cautiously avoid the use of force against third parties because of potential civil and criminal liability. The ideal grant of immunity from State domestic law for international bounty hunters for the forceful acts necessary to apprehend an indicted war criminal would not be limitless. A bounty hunter, like a civilian police officer, could still be held accountable for an excessive or unnecessary use of force.