International bounty hunters for war criminals: privatizing the enforcement of justice

Air Force Law Review,  Wntr, 2001  by Christopher M. Supernor

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Like domestic police officers, the conduct of international bounty hunters must be reviewable by some judicial body. An international bounty hunter should have complete criminal and civil immunity from State domestic law for his use of force during an actual or attempted arrest of an indicted war criminal since a State that has been harboring an indicted war criminal can not be trusted to impartially and fairly adjudicate a criminal or civil complaint against an international bounty hunter. However, an international bounty hunter's conduct during an attempted arrest should be reviewed by the same international court who issued the indictment that the bounty hunter was trying to enforce. This international court should have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate both criminal and civil claims against international bounty hunters for use of excessive force. Furthermore, this international court should use all or any portion of a bounty hunter's reward to satisfy a criminal fine or a civil judgment against a bounty hu nter.

F. Should International Bounty Hunters be Licensed? By What Licensing Authority?

Who should be eligible to hunt for war criminals? The UNSC could limit its grant of legal immunity from domestic law for the forceful acts necessary to capture a fugitive war criminal to licensed individuals. Although most jurisdictions within the United States do not require licenses, the modern trend is to license bounty hunters. [138] Requiring a license could insure that all bounty hunters receive some minimal training. Requiring a license also provides the means to exclude certain individuals from serving as an international bounty hunter. For example, ex-convicts could be excluded from acting as international bounty hunters. The UNSC could ask the UN General Assembly or an international criminal tribunal to develop the needed criteria to qualify for an international bounty hunter license and to issue any licenses. Even so, international bounty hunters should not be licensed.

Requiring all international bounty hunters to obtain a license assumes that all individuals want to work as a bounty hunter on a recurring basis. In fact, many individuals who decide to forcefully capture an indicted war criminal may do so only as the result of a one-time opportunity rather than a decision to pursue a career as an international bounty hunter. The best person to apprehend a particular war criminal might not be the full-time professional bounty hunter but an acquaintance, friend, business partner, political rival, or estranged spouse of the war criminal. If licenses were not required, individuals who have no interest in a career as a professional bounty hunter would be free to capture fugitive war criminals.

Requiring international bounty hunters to obtain a license before attempting to apprehend a war criminal would greatly reduce the number of persons engaged in the hunt. The UNSC or the international community should not be concerned about the character of the individual who delivers the custody of a fugitive war criminal. as long as custody is delivered. The UNSC should be concerned about the possibility of wrongful arrests of individuals who are unreasonably mistaken for fugitive war criminals. However, requiring international bounty hunters to hold licenses does not preclude the possibility of wrongful arrests. Even highly trained police offices occasionally arrest the wrong individual. If a bounty hunter wrongfully arrests an individual who is mistaken for an indicted war criminal then that bounty hunter would be subject to domestic civil and criminal liability. The possibility of liability under domestic law should be sufficient by itself to deter wrongful arrests. Requiring bounty hunters to be licensed would substantially reduce the number of individuals who could arrest war criminals while doing little to reduce the risk of wrongful arrests.