The 'divided self' of Polish state-owned enterprises: the culture of organizing

Introduction

With the fall of the communist system in Poland, new rules are being introduced in all dimensions of social life. The economy is being given much attention, and the transition towards a market economy has been seen as a central problem by all governments since 1989. The enterprise and its metamorphosis are examples of the most intensively discussed issues by the mass media. Contrary to the often expressed belief that organizations should change fast and radically, the much awaited reorganization often seems to be delayed (Obloj and Kostera 1994). We take up this problem in this paper. It is our interpretation here, that adaptation to market principles is hampered by the cultural mind frames which actors have adopted in coping with communist economic governance. There is a kind of cultural 'lag', by which the actors' mind frames and behaviour lag behind systemic changes introduced by the reformers: the culture of organizing requires a residue of mental stability.

In this paper we aim to develop a model of the culture of organizing of Polish State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). First, we briefly explain the main 'rules' of the communist system (i.e. the socio-politico-economic system of the 'Eastern Bloc') from the point of view of the SOE. Second, we identify some of the main characteristics of the system that have had a major influence on the culture of organizing. Third, we assume that the culture of the SOE was an answer to the systemic context and adopt a metaphor from psychology to show how the system favoured the emergence of split cultures, inhibiting economic effectiveness and the personal growth of organizational actors. Next, we discuss why and how the old cultural patterns survived and how they hinder change.

The Centrally Planned Economy and the Over-intrusive Centre

Property and Political Rationality

Under the entry 'management', the Polish Encyclopedia of Organization and Management for 1981 first gives a typical 'functions of management' definition and then states the following:

'In the socialist society, where the basic means of production are the property of the society, the principles of management are determined by highest authorities; the principles of democratic centralism formulated by Lenin, one-person leadership and the participation of the working classes in management are assumed to be fundamental.' (1981: 609)

The major difference between the 'capitalist', 'socialist'/'communist' systems (here we use the terms as labels, culturally belonging to the two systems of the world 1945-1989; we do not give these terms their original Marxist significance) is connected to the 'philosophy of property' (see e.g. Marx and Engels 1968: 904-906; Stalin 1949: 11; for critics see e.g. Staniszkis 1989). The communist system was founded upon the dogma of collective property. In reality this meant ownership of the state as a subject and property being a prominent political issue (Staniszkis 1989). In a Centrally Planned Economy (CPE), management was based on principles of political rationality (for more on the primacy of political rationality in Eastern Bloc enterprises, see Rottenburg 1994). The existence of economic organizations relied primarily not on the individual capability to accumulate profit, but was accounted for in terms of social or state interest - which turned into a symbolic doctrine. They also relied heavily on the 'good will' of political decision makers (the political decision makers of higher levels will be hereafter called 'Centre'). Creation and growth of SOEs was a fundamental symbolic act of communist systems, a 'demonstration of power'. Simultaneously, the economic rationality faded away (Staniszkis 1989), making costs 'insignificant' to the decision makers (Kozminski 1985). This contributed to the low economic effectiveness of production and a continuous lack in the economy as a whole - the emergence of an economy of shortage (Komai 1985).

Centralization and Management

In its decisions, the SOE was dependent on the Centre and the political authorities of all levels (Czamiawska 1985). The decision-making structure was excessively hierarchical and bureaucratic (Obloj 1986; Kozminski 1993; see also Beksiak 1987). Having different tasks (derived from the plan) to fulfill, management was completely absorbed by these structures (see e.g. Granick 1960). Strategic decisions 'belonged' to the Centre, management was only an 'executor' of decisions made somewhere else. The managers were 'officially' declared subservient, but simultaneously they had a responsibility for 'their' company and 'their' employees. The problem of responsibility without authority was repeatedly highlighted (e.g. Lipiniski 1981; Kozminski and Obloj 1983; Kozminski 1985; Obloj 1986). The Centre 'possessed' and allocated information, resources and meanings, which it interpreted and 'distributed' according to the dogma of 'planned development', i.e. social and economic engineering, based on the assumption that some (the Centre) knew what is good for all of us (Karpinski 1992).