Corporate Governance and Firm Diversification
Financial Management (Financial Management Association), Spring, 2000 by Ronald C. Anderson, Thomas W. Bates, John M. Bizjak, Michael L. Lemmon
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Summary Statistics of Governance and Financial Characteristics for the Full Sample of Companies
Data on board structure, compensation, ownership, and CEO characteristics come from corporate proxy statements. Segment data come from the Compustat Industry Segment database. Revenue-based excess value is calculated for each firm using the methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995). Financial data come from Compustat. Option values are calculated using the Black-Scholes (1973) model adjusted for dividends. For all variables except the excess value measures, the sample contains 1,851 firm-year observations from 199 firms for the years 1985-1994. For the excess value measure, the sample contains 1,748 firm-year observations.