The safety man: Brian O'Neill and his team at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety wage war on unsafe vehicles and outdated government standards

Automotive Industries,  Nov, 2001  by Gerry Kobe

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Until the early 1980s, government regulations were the primary way safety features made it into vehicles. For automakers, that spawned a minimalist approach wherein they spent the least amount necessary to meet the minimum standards required by law. For the OEM'S, it was the perfect solution. Simple standards kept the playing field level, affordable and provided an easy pass/fail target. But to consumers, it drew attention to the fact that some automakers, particularly those from Europe, voluntarily designed to a higher standard.

By the mid-1980s, safety minded companies like Volvo, Saab, BMW and Mercedes-Benz began cashing in on their reputation for crashworthiness. And to the shock of the U.S.-based industry that defiantly said "you can't sell safety," consumers pushed domestic automakers to make safety a priority.

"We saw that as an opportunity to do things the government couldn't," says Brian O'Neill, president of the Arlington, Va-based IIHS. "We conceived of having our own crash test facility and test procedures that were different from the government's. We didn't want to compete, but government agencies, by design, are not flexible or fast responding. We knew we could promote safety improvements more rapidly."

One of the tests the IIHS would use to achieve that goal was a controversial offset, 40-mph frontal crash into a deformable barrier. The test was actually conceived by Mercedes-Benz and already under development in Europe. It was viewed as a more real world alternative to fiat barrier testing, which was and is the basis of today's Federal New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) standard.

Then, in 1992, when the Institute opened the Vehicle Research Center (VRC), a crash test facility located in Ruckersville, Va, it put into action its plan to raise the bar on safety. It performed its first low-speed crash in February of 1993 and subsequently shook the world of automotive safety.

Shaking Up the OEMs

From the very first crash test program conducted at IIHS, the results rattled automakers. Even O'Neill expresses surprise at their early findings.

"Our first program was with mid-size cars like Taurus," he recalls. "And of those cars, we expected the Saab 900 to do very well because of Saab's concern for safety. Well, it did terrible. It collapsed. We thought maybe our speed was too high, but then we did our second test, which was a Subaru Legacy. We didn't expect that car to do well at all and it did fine. At that point we knew we had a great program because we were as knowledgeable as anyone and we guessed completely wrong."

Initially, automakers cried "foul" over the tests because vehicles were tested to a standard they were not designed for. Body engineers in particular were being chastised for doing a bad engineering job.

"I feel for those guys," O'Neill laments. "They did their job, but they weren't given the right priorities -- that's the fault of the policymakers. I admire Toyota because it actually sent engineers to us who asked, 'What are you doing and how do you do it? We want to do well in these tests.' The company bought into this from the top down and now there isn't a single Toyota that doesn't get a "good" rating from us."

David Zuby, vice president at the VRC, says his experience with automakers proves that the Institute's tests help promote safety awareness.

"Engineers tell me this is what they need to do better," Zuby explains. "Too often they are just given the outside shape of the vehicle, told what kind of engine will be in it and then asked to eke safety out of what's left. They leverage the fact that they don't test well because it gives them more clout. They don't have to fight so hard for crush space."

The offset test is particularly important to safety engineers because it tests structural integrity. It challenges the safety cage that protects occupants. In contrast, the 35-mph NCAP test makes a good adjunct to an offset crash. It generates much higher deceleration forces because the vehicle stops abruptly, making it ideal for evaluating restraint systems.

Different Views on Safety

Not everyone agrees with the results or validity of the IIHS tests or even the approach of the Institute. For example, in the offset test, heavy vehicles need to have a stiff front end to pass. That makes them potentially dangerous when they strike other vehicles.

"It's a valid criticism," O'Neill responds. "That is part of the reason we have drawn the line and not tested the largest vehicles, like the Ford Expedition. There is a point where the vehicle is just too heavy for this test."

Another common criticism is that the results can be deceiving. Critics argue that when a small vehicle gets the same rating as a large vehicle, it falsely implies that they are equally safe. O'Neill counters that the limitation in all barrier tests is that the crash is always equivalent of a vehicle hitting itself. He adds that using a moving barrier might give an assessment independent of weight, but because half of the traffic deaths are in single vehicle crashes, it might inappropriately put emphasis where it doesn't belong.