DOE seeks polygraph program continuance despite objections by national academy - News and Comment - National Academy of Sciences protests Department of Energy's decision

Scientists concerned about extensive use of polygraphs at the national weapons labs had until June 13 to register their objections to U.S. Department of Energy-proposed rulemaking that would maintain the polygraph program in its present form.

The preliminary decision by DOE astonished some scientists and management at the labs because it essentially ignored the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The Academy study (SI, January/February 2003), carried out for DOE at the behest of Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-New Mexico, expressed strong reservations about the value of the polygraph testing when used to examine large numbers of people on very general grounds.

"Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected," the Academy had said. The test has more utility, the NAS found, for individuals questioned specifically about particular events that occurred at particular times.

"DOE does not believe that the issues that the NAS has raised about the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a decision by DOE to abandon it as a screening tool," DOE said in its proposed rulemaking published in the April 14 Federal Register.

DOE said as steward of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, it has an obligation "to use the best tools available" to protect sensitive information. "Therefore we will continue to use counterintelligence-scope polygraph examinations as one of several tools to screen personnel requiring access to high-risk information."

Bingaman and Sen. Pete Domenici, R-New Mexico, a state with two of the three DOE weapons labs, questioned the DOE decision, as did Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-California, whose district includes the third.

Bingaman said he was "surprised and disappointed."

"This is definitely not the more focused policy I hoped for," Domenici said. "I continue to believe that the system is too much, and an affront, especially since the polygraph program was so thoroughly criticized by the National Academy of Sciences. I hope the Department will rethink this situation."

Said Tauscher: "I am particularly surprised at the Department's decision to retain the use of the polygraph program after it was so thoroughly criticized by the National Academy of Sciences." She called for DOE to support a hearing on "the rationale that caused it to ignore the findings of a study that it itself had commissioned."

Labs scientists, including several physicians, have pointed out the hazards and essential uselessness of a test that in a screening mode (where the vast majority of people tested are not suspected of any wrongdoing) can produce false positives far in excess of any possible true negatives (catching a spy). And they have repeatedly pointed our that spies who have taken the test have passed, and no spy has been caught by one.

DOE, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence agencies, however, are reluctant to give up a tool that is essentially used as an intimidation tactic but might possibly elicit confessions from wrongdoers.

DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham invited the national labs to participate in the notice and comment process, deadline June 14, and there was every indication that they would do so.

The labs' stance is that this is a preliminary decision that can be modified. Whether that's the case remains to be seen.

"NNSA has assured us that the present rulemaking is an interim action," said C. Paul Robinson, President of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. "However, I was disturbed by some of the language that criticized the National Academy of Sciences study. I wholeheartedly endorse that study's findings, as I endorsed the earlier study by Sandia's senior scientists, who came to a similar conclusion. We will be registering our views as part of the rule-making process, but unfortunately we will have to continue the DOE counterintelligence polygraphs as required by law and continue the voluntary polygraphs as required by other government sponsors.

Kendrick Frazier is editor of the SKEPTICAL INQUIRER.

COPYRIGHT 2003 Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal
COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group