Leashing the dogs of war
National Interest, The, Fall, 2003 by David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey
Legal restraints are also becoming increasingly one-sided, and primarily affect the United States and those few of our allies that continue to take warfare seriously. Plainly said, we now have virtually four different sets of legal norms governing the use of armed force: the traditional strictures, subscribed to by the United States and some of its allies; the policing model, embraced primarily by the Europeans and Canadians; the more permissive norms, which eschew many of the post-World War II developments, embraced by Russia, China, India and a few others; and the "anything goes" approach, with the particular emphasis on the deliberate attacks on civilians practiced by the rogue states and terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hizballah.
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Given this overall context, it is all the more regrettable that the fundamental differences between the United States and its allies--over when military force may be lawfully used, how it must be applied properly and who should enforce the norms--show no signs of abatement. These have already led to misunderstandings, tension and outright anger on both sides of the Atlantic and have proven to be highly counterproductive. Franco-German insistence that UN authorization was necessary before military action could be taken against Iraq did not forestall the attack on Saddam Hussein, but it nearly wrecked the Security Council. Similarly, assertions that the ICC can investigate, prosecute and punish Americans, whether the U.S. government has ratified the treaty or not, have not led the United States to accept the court's authority. Rather, they have prompted a determined and increasingly successful U.S. effort to obtain from dozens of countries Article 98 agreements guaranteeing that Americans will not be surrendered to the ICC. Efforts to secure overly stringent rules of engagement and other unrealistic jus in bello norms have strained alliance cohesion and impaired the military effectiveness of coalition warfare.
Continuing to pretend that these are just minor problems or occasional disputes that can be papered over or resolved through adroit diplomacy is counter-productive. It is imperative to grasp the nature of the problems we face and their full implications. This is particularly true because so much of the European challenge to the American way of war is couched in legal and ethical terms.
The continued perpetuation of legal and moral confusion could eventually erode the American public's consensus supporting any future use of force, and threaten U.S. security and national interests. Hence, it is necessary to make reaffirmation of the traditional laws of war, rules that appropriately balance humanitarian imperatives and the demands of military necessity, an American priority. Ideally, a vigorous U.S. effort to reestablish the traditional jus in bello and jus ad bellum, and restore the role of sovereign states in both developing the substantive norms and upholding them, would bear fruit.