The new containment: an alliance against nuclear terrorism

DURING THE Cold War, American and Russian policy-makers and citizens thought long and hard about the possibility of nuclear attacks on their respective homelands. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the threat of nuclear weapons catastrophe faded away from most minds. This is both ironic and potentially tragic, since the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States or Russia is certainly greater today than it was in 1989.

In the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's September 11 assault, which awakened the world to the reality of global terrorism, it is incumbent upon serious national security analysts to think again about the unthinkable. Could a nuclear terrorist attack happen today? Our considered answer is: yes, unquestionably, without any doubt. It is not only a possibility, but in fact the most urgent unaddressed national security threat to both the United States and Russia. (1)

Consider this hypothetical: A crude nuclear weapon constructed from stolen materials explodes in Red Square in Moscow. A 15-kiloton blast would instantaneously destroy the Kremlin, Saint Basil's Cathedral, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the Tretyakov Gallery, and tens of thousands of individual lives. In Washington, an equivalent explosion near the White House would completely destroy that building, the Old Executive Office Building and everything within a one-mile radius, including the Departments of State, Treasury, the Federal Reserve and all of their occupants--as well as damaging the Potomac-facing side of the Pentagon.

Psychologically, such a hypothetical is as difficult to internalize as are the plot lines of a writer like Tom Clancy (whose novel Debt of Honor ends with terrorists crashing a jumbo jet into the U.S. Capitol on Inauguration Day, and whose The Sum of All Fears contemplates the very scenario we discuss--the detonation of a nuclear device in a major American metropolis by terrorists). That these kinds of scenarios are physically possible, however, is an undeniable, brute fact.

After the first nuclear terrorist attack, the Duma, Congress--or what little is left of them--and the press will investigate: Who knew what, when? They will ask what could have been done to prevent the attack. Most officials will no doubt seek cover behind the claim that "no one could have imagined" this happening. But that defense should ring hollow. We have unambiguous strategic warning today that a nuclear terrorist attack could occur at any moment. Responsible leaders should be asking hard questions now. Nothing prevents the governments of Russia, America and other countries from taking effective action immediately--nothing, that is, but a lack of determination.

The argument made here can be summarized in two propositions: first, nuclear terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the United States, Russia and other nations; second, nuclear terrorism is a largely preventable disaster. Preventing nuclear terrorism is a large, complex, but ultimately finite challenge that can be met by a bold, determined, but nonetheless finite response. The current mismatch between the seriousness of the threat on the one hand, and the actions governments are now taking to meet it on the other, is unacceptable. Below we assess the threat and outline a solution that begins with a U.S.-Russian led Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.

Assessing the Threat

A COMPREHENSIVE threat assessment must consider both the likelihood of an event and the magnitude of its anticipated consequences. As described above, the impact of even a crude nuclear explosion in a city would produce devastation in a class by itself. (2) A half dozen nuclear explosions across the United States or Russia would shift the course of history. The question is: how likely is such an event?

Security studies offer no well-developed methodology for estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events. Contemplating the possibility of a criminal act, Sherlock Holmes investigated three factors: motive, means and opportunity. That framework can be useful for analyzing the question at hand. If no actor simultaneously has motive, means and opportunity, no nuclear terrorist act will occur. Where these three factors are abundant and widespread, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack increases. The questions become: Is anyone motivated to instigate a nuclear attack? Could terrorist groups acquire the means to attack the United States or Russia with nuclear weapons? Could these groups find or create an opportunity to act?

I. Motive

There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden and his associates have serious nuclear ambitions. For almost a decade they have been actively seeking nuclear weapons, and, as President Bush has noted, they would use such weapons against the United States or its allies "in a heartbeat." In 2000, the CIA intercepted a message in which a member of Al-Qaeda boasted of plans for a "Hiroshima" against America. According to the Justice Department indictment for the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, "At various times from at least as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others, known and unknown, made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons." Additional evidence from a former Al-Qaeda member describes attempts to buy uranium of South African origin, repeated travels to three Central Asian states to try to buy a complete warhead or weapons-usable material, and discussions with Chechen criminal groups in which money and drugs were offered for nuclear weapons.