Modernity And Tradition In The Islamic Movements In Iraq: Continuity And Discontinuity In The Role Of The Ulama

This means that al-Sadr's elimination was interpreted as part of a power struggle among religious families, i.e., between al-Sadr's family and alHakim's family, however the political parties tried to explain it in the context of their political ideology. As for al-Da'wa's perception of Sadiq al-Sadr, it recognizes him as "al-Sadr the second" after Baqir al-Sadr who was "al-Sadr the first" in his effort to reform marja'iya, and claims that he was a member of the party, praising his works highly. Rawf also considers that he has the same approach as Baqir al-Sadr for the institutionalization of marja'iya. He interprets that the encouragement of wakil network was carried out as a system, not through personal relationship, and this was to realize the notion of Baqir al-Sadr's "institutionalization of responsibility of marja'iya". His emphasis on the gravity of the marja'iya/ umma relation also can be understood in the same context as Fadl Allah, who repeatedly claims the necessity of openness of marja'iya toward umma. What is important to note here is the way in which how any form of struggle between political organizations might be translated into traditional-patrimonial family rivalry among Shi'i 'ulama. The perception of segmentation of society, its fragmentation to the level of clan and family, as re-tribalization goes on in Iraq, [39] and is not alien among Islamic movements that are seen as universal and cross bordering.

MODERNITY AND TRADITION IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN IRAQ: ADOPTING GELLNER'S MODEL

Here we can summarize two different styles of activities in the recent development in Islamic movements in Iraq as follows; one is institutionalization as a modern political party, and the other as a de-institutionalized body based on the social and cultural network of marja'iya.

Thus classifying Iraqi Shi'i Islamic political organizations, Gellner's categorization can be adopted and useful for further analysis. [40] Gellner classifies two types of Islam, one is the syndrome of characteristics called P, which are represented by strict monotheism; Puritanism; stress on scriptural revelation and hence on literacy; egalitarianism between believers; absence of special mediation; minimization of ritual or mystical extravagance, etc. He proceeds to say that it is not incompatible with modernity, hinting its similarity with Christian Protestantism. The other category, syndrome of characteristics called C, are illustrated by a tendency toward hierarchy; priesthood or ritual specialization and a multiplicity of spirits; incarnations of religion in perceptual symbols or images; a tendency toward profusion of ritual and mystical practices; and an ethic of loyalty toward personality rather than respect for rules. By "C" he hints at Christian Roman Catholicism.

This division is meaningful when we consider the variety of political activities of these Islamic organizations. In his classification, we may say that al-Da'wa's institutionalization as a party and its theoretical orientation can be categorized in the first group, syndrome P. 'Amal and SCIRI in recent times, on the other hand, can be categorized as syndrome C, as they are based on a traditional type of marja'iya composed mainly from politicized 'ulama. They underline the patrimonial structure of society in mobilizing the people. This can be recognized as an extension of the political activities of Shi'i 'ulama in the anti-British uprisings of 1918 and 1920, or like Muhammad Kashif alGhita who sympathized with the nationalist movement and maintained close relations with Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani. [41] Here marja'iya is utilized as a tool for wider mobilization. On the contrary, al-Da'wa can be classified as an Islamic ideological political party for which marja'iya reinforces the legitimacy or political doctrin e.