Ecclesiology and Ethics

Moreover, is it sociologically meaningful to talk about ecclesial formation without specifying the distinctiveness of the church more strongly than Mudge seems ready to do? Mudge questions the sociological realism of Hauerwas's and Milbank's understanding of the church, especially for liberal Protestantism. But one could also question the sociological realism of Mudge's approach. If the church is not the primary identity-forming unity, other forces will take its place. Mudge laments the privatization of the Christian faith-practice that has resulted from the rise of the modern nation-state. Hauerwas and Milbank agree and this is also a reason why they stress the relative independence of the church.

If ethics as ecclesial formation has to do with people being formed by the retelling of the Christian story and by common congregational practices, some basic confidence must exist in the common Christian tradition and practices. Mudge seems to agree, both in general, when he says that "little of that vision can be fulfilled unless faith communities can enact some sort of principled moral coherence" (p.70), and regarding "mainline Protestantism" in particular, when he says that in its "thin" traditions public ways of thinking are likely to predominate to the point of making the terminology of religious formation largely ritualistic and perfunctory" (p.89). One might further ask what ecclesial formation can mean in the context of European national churches (formally established or not) such as the Nordic "folk churches", which include the general pluralism of the society to an even greater extent. One thing that happens when ecclesial identity and formation are weak is that formation becomes primarily a question of social location. The social strata to which people belong are more determinative than the church.(37)

If the churches are to practise independent moral formation, what practical and social consequences will this have for actual church life? Moral life and thinking, like all human life and thinking, are by nature bodily and social, depending on social context both at the micro- and macro-level. And the micro-level is directly more important than the macro-level. This has to do with such elementary matters as the frequency and intensity (the amount of emotional energy invested) of interaction. If church life consists of no more than an hour of weekly worship, with a low level of interaction, the degree of possible formation will be low. The process of "social transfiguration" Mudge describes simply needs a more frequent and thicker interaction. Tree, "the heart of Christian moral formation ... lies in worship" (p.81), but this worship must be embedded in a broader network of common practices. If not, other types of interaction -- family, work, peer-groups -- will be much more powerful.

In the sort of church life Yoder presupposes, the church is primarily a people with a specific identity. The family is more a function of the church than the church is something besides the family or a support to the family. This means that "church" consists of many different forms of ecclesial interaction within various networks on several levels, creating a higher degree of intensity than one finds in the typical mainline Protestant church that Mudge assumes. It also presupposes that the church is visible and that it has borders (even if fluid) and some structures of authority and discipline. This looks different in different church traditions. But without this type of church life, Mudge's talk about "a sacramental transfiguration of everyday life" (p.81) and the discernment of the Spirit's work in the world easily becomes only a legitimation of actual lack of ecclesial formation.