China - Regrets Only - Brief Article

As all the world knows, on April 1 an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter collided near Hainan, and both went down. For ten days, the government of China refused to release the 24 downed American servicemen and demanded an apology, for both the alleged spying and its lost pilot. On April 11, the Bush administration secured the release of the crew by issuing a letter that 1) apologized for our plane's breach of Chinese airspace, 2) expressed appreciation for "China's efforts to see to the well-being of our crew," and 3) agreed to a meeting to discuss when the plane will be returned and how future collisions can be avoided.

In judging this settlement, it is important to keep in mind what China's real goal during this episode has been. What China wants is to push America out of the South China Sea. When Beijing says that the planes collided in Chinese airspace, and Washington responds that they were over international waters, they are not disputing a location. They are disputing a jurisdiction. The Chinese claim that the sea and the sky above it are theirs. They are therefore justified in harassing our planes to try to drive us out-even if that harassment increases the risk of a deadly accident. Such as the one the Chinese caused on April 1.

Beijing's demand for an apology was a provocation dressed up as a protest. To apologize for our surveillance would have been to concede China's territorial claim. And with America out of the South China Sea, Taiwan would be even more vulnerable to Beijing. The Chinese were holding Americans hostage so that they might be able to hold Taiwan hostage later.

The administration should be commended for avoiding this concession. The letter it released is ambiguous about when our plane entered Chinese airspace-before the collision or during the emergency landing. Less commendable were the administration's concessions on the intangible dimensions of security to which we refer as "face." To express regret over the Chinese pilot's death is unobjectionable. But to apologize for a landing forced by Chinese recklessness and preceded by several unanswered Mayday calls, and to thank the Chinese for treating American hostages well, veers near kowtow territory.

No doubt the administration considered these concessions necessary to get the crew back safely and quickly. But their return, though obviously welcome, should never have been the principal concern of American policy. Our servicemen are not more important than the objective they serve: America's security, which includes our standing in the world. Our adversaries and allies alike now have further reason to believe that we are a sentimental superpower, and thus a vulnerable one.

The damage would have been worse had the administration given in to the Chinese demand entirely and apologized for our plane's being over the South China Sea. Moreover, the damage need not be lasting. In its talks with the Chinese, the administration can still hold firm on our right to conduct surveillance there. If we sent surveillance planes to the area in the week following the crew's release, and accompanied those planes with fighters, that would underscore our resolve. Gathering intelligence in the South China Sea is also a way of demonstrating our commitment to keeping the peace between China and Taiwan. The case for defensive arms sales to Taiwan was strong before this latest incident, and has been made stronger still by it.

During the Clinton years, American policy toward China was marked by wishful thinking. Officials clung to the fantasy that China was our "strategic partner," or that commercial engagement alone would make it so. But China's hostage-taking has gone a long way toward wiping away any remaining American illusions about this ambitious, ruthless, and therefore dangerous dictatorship. Stripped of illusions, we will have many advantages over China in the conflicts to come. China may, for one thing, be making miscalculations of its own. Beijing is underestimating its neighbors' desire to see America retain its presence in the region. And it is overestimating America's willingness to be pushed around.

Speaking of which: The administration's defense review cannot proceed quickly enough.

COPYRIGHT 2001 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2001 Gale Group