A clash of interests: will it be the national interest, or the interests of the 'international community'? This is a campaign question

PRESIDENTIAL elections are not, as a rule, decided by foreign-policy issues. But key foreign-policy issues can be decided by presidential elections, and this will be particularly true of 2004's. The differences between George W. Bush and John Kerry in their approaches to international relations could not be more dramatic. Never has the partisan gulf been wider. While in the past Democrats and Republicans frequently disagreed about individual issues--the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet arms control--at stake now is a fundamental operational principle: whether American foreign policy will be principally driven by considerations of the national interest or by a tender regard for the wishes of the "international community," based on an ideology of "multilateralism."

Although the Left in general, and Democratic activists in particular, have ceaselessly carped about George W. Bush's "unilateralism," the president has actually followed a highly pragmatic approach to international cooperation, acting, whenever possible, in concert with other states and institutions--including Europe and the United Nations. In fact, on each of the major foreign-policy challenges it has faced, and continues to face--including war with al-Qaeda, deposing Saddam Hussein, interdicting WMDs and their components, and denuclearizing North Korea, Iran, and Libya--the administration has sought (and obtained) the support and assistance of numerous other countries and international organizations.

At the same time, Bush has eschewed improvident international commitments (such as the International Criminal Court Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol) that would tie America's hands in meeting the challenges of an increasingly dangerous world, compromise its sovereignty, and undermine its prosperity. Perhaps more to the point, the president has consistently treated multilateralism as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. This is the real complaint from Bush's critics, and they hate him for it--openly and unapologetically.

The religion of multilateralism began in post-World War II Europe, where the creation of multilateral Franco-German (and then "European") institutions was seen as the antidote to the nationalism that had sparked two world wars. The keystone of these efforts was the subordination of country-specific interests (particularly those of Germany) to the aspirations of a greater European community, de-legitimizing national action in the process. All this was so effective that, to this day, nascent unilateralism is one of the most serious charges that can be flung at a German politician, and even French officials routinely proclaim the overriding importance of common European interests in foreign affairs--rather than La Patrie or La Gloire. (Whether they believe what they say--the French foreign minister reportedly adorns his office with Napoleon Bonaparte's portrait--is another matter.)

Not surprisingly, France and Germany remain the "engines" of European integration, and, nearly 60 years later, the "common European home" has blossomed into a union that will soon stretch from Ireland to Poland. Together, Paris and Berlin--which secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld accurately characterized as "Old Europe"--seem determined to recreate something like the medieval Franco-German empire of Charlemagne. These new Carolingians have drafted a constitution (of which many of Europe's smaller states are understandably wary), and they are already flexing their ideological muscles. European politicians have set forth to preach the message that national sovereignty is anachronistic, if not positively dangerous, and that the "international community" is the ultimate font of legitimacy. Unfortunately, this message has been endorsed in the U.S. explicitly by senior Democratic officials, such as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, and indirectly by Democratic politicians--including John Kerry--who appear to consider "engagement" with the "international community" the lodestar of a successful foreign policy.

Why Old Europe's new learning should appeal to anybody in the United States is not immediately obvious: The U.S. has never indulged in the ethnically based nationalism that ravaged 20th-century Europe, instead cultivating a far more inclusive patriotism that, as George Will once noted, accepts anyone willing to subscribe to the principles announced in the Declaration of Independence. The first and foremost of those principles, of course, is the right to self-government, free from "supranational" interference.

Nevertheless, the Old World's thinking has always had a profound impact on the New, and especially on "progressive" opinion. While American conservatives tend to look to the British Enlightenment for their intellectual inspiration, the Left has traditionally found its ideas, and ideologies, in continental Europe--from Rousseau, to Marx, to Jean Jaures. This may explain why many American liberals, including a number of prominent Democratic leaders and foreign-policy experts, have so thoroughly embraced the European ideology of multilateralism. Yet this ideology is profoundly anti-democratic in nature, and irreconcilable with core American values such as self-government. The fact that it has been adopted by a self-styled populist party is astonishing.

At the same time, many U.S. multilateralists came of age during the Vietnam War, when political activism (both in the United States and Europe) involved vocal, and often violent, opposition to American government policy. Although the days of flag-burning are long past, the habits of thought engendered during the Vietnam experience, especially regarding the use of American military force overseas, are still evident; hence a straightforward, national-interest-based foreign policy is considered by many on the left to be morally dubious, if not outright repugnant.

As a result, it is hardly surprising that no element of Bush's foreign policy has so outraged the Left in general, and leading Democrats in particular, as the principle of "preemptive" war--a doctrine thoroughly grounded in considerations of national interest. The president has made clear that, in an age in which civilians are deliberately targeted and weapons of mass destruction are readily available, the United States cannot afford to absorb a "first strike," but will identify gathering threats and act to preempt them. This "doctrine" is nothing more than common sense, and there is bountiful state practice establishing its legitimacy under international law. One example--far too often overlooked--is the September 1939 Anglo-French ultimatums to Hitler, which declared that only a prompt withdrawal from Poland could stop the Western democracies from entering the war. Neither state, of course, had been attacked. Neither was threatened with attack, and the bulk of Germany's armed forces were headed in exactly the opposite direction. This too was an "elective" war, a war of choice--a choice made because neither Britain nor France was willing to "wait its turn."

Despite preemption's firm grounding in international law and practice, most leading Democrats have denounced the doctrine, although none--including and especially Senator Kerry--has suggested an alternative beyond generalized platitudes about seeking the assistance of our "allies" and the U.N. Security Council. They have yet to suggest exactly what assistance--assistance that could actually protect the American people from a reprise of September 11--those allies might provide. The United Nations depends on American military might to implement its resolutions, not to mention guarantee the security of its own headquarters, while our European cohorts continue to reduce their military capabilities to embarrassing levels.

What our allies can offer, though, is the cloak of multilateralism. The "international community"'s permission is just about the only coin Old Europe has left to spend, and so it is determined to inflate that currency's value. It has accomplished this by advancing a view of international law that, on virtually every issue, works primarily as a means of constraining the United States. This is especially true with respect to the legal justification for the use of military force, and explains Europe's insistence that only the United Nations (where France enjoys veto power) can authorize legitimate use of military force. It also explains the near-hysterical Franco-German reaction when the administration sought to reward its friends, and disadvantage its opponents, by reserving certain reconstruction contracts for nationals of Iraqi Coalition countries.

Naturally, the new Carolingians recognize an exception to this rule where their own vital interests are involved--as demonstrated by the 1999 NATO war with Serbia over Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis was of paramount importance to France and Germany (one fearing Muslim reaction, the other a renewed flood of Balkan refugees)--but of only humanitarian concern to the United States. Russia would have vetoed any Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against the Serbs, and so France, Germany, and the EU were happy to have NATO proceed without U.N. authorization. It is a purely self-interested form of legitimacy that our allies are peddling, and the role they appear to have reserved for the United States is not unlike that of the 18thcentury Hessians: the muscle. But unlike the Hessians, who were paid for their services, the United States is expected to both fight and foot the bill.

This, ultimately, is what the multilateralism the Democrats have embraced means, and this is what they will ask the American people to endorse on November 2. In the months to come, the Bush administration would be well advised to articulate clearly the profound differences between its national-interest-driven foreign policy--where multilateral action is a means to an end--and Senator Kerry's policy, where multilateralism is an end in itself. (Indeed, Kerry proudly proclaims that he is supported by many foreign leaders against President Bush.) The electorate can then decide whether Uncle Sam should become Uncle Sucker.

Messrs. Casey and Rivkin are partners in the Washington, D.C., office of Baker & Hostetler LLP. Both served in the Justice Department during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.

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