A clash of interests: will it be the national interest, or the interests of the 'international community'? This is a campaign question

At the same time, many U.S. multilateralists came of age during the Vietnam War, when political activism (both in the United States and Europe) involved vocal, and often violent, opposition to American government policy. Although the days of flag-burning are long past, the habits of thought engendered during the Vietnam experience, especially regarding the use of American military force overseas, are still evident; hence a straightforward, national-interest-based foreign policy is considered by many on the left to be morally dubious, if not outright repugnant.

As a result, it is hardly surprising that no element of Bush's foreign policy has so outraged the Left in general, and leading Democrats in particular, as the principle of "preemptive" war--a doctrine thoroughly grounded in considerations of national interest. The president has made clear that, in an age in which civilians are deliberately targeted and weapons of mass destruction are readily available, the United States cannot afford to absorb a "first strike," but will identify gathering threats and act to preempt them. This "doctrine" is nothing more than common sense, and there is bountiful state practice establishing its legitimacy under international law. One example--far too often overlooked--is the September 1939 Anglo-French ultimatums to Hitler, which declared that only a prompt withdrawal from Poland could stop the Western democracies from entering the war. Neither state, of course, had been attacked. Neither was threatened with attack, and the bulk of Germany's armed forces were headed in exactly the opposite direction. This too was an "elective" war, a war of choice--a choice made because neither Britain nor France was willing to "wait its turn."

Despite preemption's firm grounding in international law and practice, most leading Democrats have denounced the doctrine, although none--including and especially Senator Kerry--has suggested an alternative beyond generalized platitudes about seeking the assistance of our "allies" and the U.N. Security Council. They have yet to suggest exactly what assistance--assistance that could actually protect the American people from a reprise of September 11--those allies might provide. The United Nations depends on American military might to implement its resolutions, not to mention guarantee the security of its own headquarters, while our European cohorts continue to reduce their military capabilities to embarrassing levels.

What our allies can offer, though, is the cloak of multilateralism. The "international community"'s permission is just about the only coin Old Europe has left to spend, and so it is determined to inflate that currency's value. It has accomplished this by advancing a view of international law that, on virtually every issue, works primarily as a means of constraining the United States. This is especially true with respect to the legal justification for the use of military force, and explains Europe's insistence that only the United Nations (where France enjoys veto power) can authorize legitimate use of military force. It also explains the near-hysterical Franco-German reaction when the administration sought to reward its friends, and disadvantage its opponents, by reserving certain reconstruction contracts for nationals of Iraqi Coalition countries.