Headache upon Headache: Questions of Iraq, nukes, and occupation

We can do this right, and we must: but again, that depends on setting realistic objectives for the post-war management of Iraq -- doing neither too little nor too much. If the United States plans a protracted post-World War II-style occupation and military government, logic suggests a very large invasion force to demonstrate maximum, overwhelming power, the better to inspire first dread and then awe. Such an approach appeals as if by second nature to U.S. Army brass these days, specifically to the bureaucratized impulse to force protection that has long since suborned its warrior ethos. But this form of overreaching would be too much: It would sink the United States deeper into an area where its hegemony is unnatural, and the blowback would be predictably venomous.

If, on the other hand, the United States seeks a minimum feasible post- war political profile in Iraq, as it should, that suggests a smaller invasion force that would avoid targeting the Iraqi army insofar as that is possible. We would inspire more awe and respect if we decapitated the regime and won over the professional military to finish off the Ba'ath. In such a scenario, Iraqis would fight Saddam's Praetorian Guard in downtown Baghdad if necessary, and far fewer Iraqis would die by American hands. The Iraqi army, together with the Iraqi opposition we are trying to nurture, would work out the post-war political structure of the country, with the United States in a low- profile supporting role. Such an approach carries a risk of doing too little, but there are no risk-free scenarios concerning Iraq. Still, if we learn them well, both the lessons of Afghanistan, and the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, can minimize the risks on this side.

Success is also essential for two other reasons beyond removing the literal danger of Iraqi weapons and deflating the morale of would-be terrorists. First, it would strike a mortal blow against state support for terrorism worldwide. Iraq's connection to 9/11 aside, there is no question that Iraq has been a state sponsor of terrorism. It could yet become a veritable K-Mart for WMD supplies to terrorists, and it is small comfort, given the stakes, that it has (probably) not already done so. To allow Iraq to do what North Korea has already done would encourage terrorism, proliferation, and, worst of all, the nexus between the two.

Second, eliminating Saddam's regime and its weapons programs -- again, if done properly -- would strengthen the present structure of peace among the great powers. Apocalyptical terrorism is a threat to the Westphalian system itself, which is why, within days of September 11, many saw what had happened as an opportunity to advance great-power peace and cooperation. This has come about to some extent (as evidenced by progress in U.S. relations with Russia and India), though an American style more given to observing the "pretense of concert" -- to borrow Coral Bell's apt phrase in The National Interest -- would have allowed it to develop faster and further. If the administration accepts the need for such pretense with regard to Iraq, as it belatedly seems to, the sinews of international peace themselves will be thickened. Contrarily, if the administration gives up the effort too soon, and goes to war in such a way that it erodes trust and cooperation among the major powers -- and further estranges the United States from its feckless but still best friends in Europe -- it may well end up conquering in a way that turns victory into defeat.