Insecurity Complex - Chinese espionage from US laboratories

So, is China, with the opportunity to learn America's most valuable secrets and the means to exploit them, about to leap years ahead in development of its military capabilities? Yes and no.

Assume that we have given China virtually total access to our most important secrets about nuclear weapons and missiles. Assume the same for every other sensitive weapons and intelligence system. To do otherwise is probably foolish, given the record revealed so far.

Beijing still will not be in a position to meet U.S. power unit for unit, or technology for technology. Rather, given China's weaknesses and scarce resources, it will ferret out U.S. vulnerabilities and focus on those. Expect the Chinese to increase their efforts to develop sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-stealth technologies. They will concentrate on exploiting the vulnerabilities of our "information warfare" in satellites and communications facilities.

The most prominent issue raised by the Los Alamos case is nuclear- weapons miniaturization. Next in rank is access to the "legacy codes" of accumulated nuclear-testing data. Together, these exposures of vital information to Chinese intelligence may lead to an increase of Chinese nuclear firepower mounted on intercontinental missiles that might be aimed at the United States.

So far, however, China has not transformed its missile strike force to reflect these intelligence gains. Possessing only about two dozen liquid-fueled intercontinental missiles that could threaten the U.S., China has yet to be seen to test and field "MIRVS" on mobile solid-fuel rockets. China has long had problems converting theory into reality in the arena of weapons.

How about the Clinton administration's responsibility? Or its allegations that responsibility really lies with the Reagan and Bush administrations? The evidence revealed so far suggests that there is plenty of blame for mismanagement and inattention to go around. Investigations of Wen Ho Lee began in 1984, yet he is accused of erasing sensitive computer files as late as this year.

Americans are likely to be subjected to further shocks as the extent of the security problem becomes clearer. Remedies will be sought. Sen. Richard Shelby, Republican of Louisiana, has introduced legislation banning foreigners from sensitive countries from visiting the National Laboratories. This seems a no-brainer, but would actually conflict with U.S. nonproliferation policy by prohibiting visits to the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia, which coordinates supervision of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, among other activities.

China, for its part, ought to take notice. If Beijing begins to try to leapfrog its weapons development with a view to developing a credible threat against the U.S., the American people will demand a response that could end up being very costly to both countries-and the United States starts with enormous advantages. In the intelligence business, they call this "blowback."

Mr. Paal is president of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, D.C.

COPYRIGHT 1999 National Review, Inc.
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