Most Popular White Papers
Privateer?
National Review, Nov 7, 1986
Privateer?
DURING THE days of the Spanish Main and the gold-laden galleons, the English came up with a bright idea: the privateer. If an Englishman had distinguished himself, say, at the Battle of Zutphen, or if he had political influence, he could receive a license to operate as a pirate against all ships not under the English flag. He was not part of the Royal Navy, but he was working in parallel with it, and could do things in peacetime that were ruled out for the regular forces. Many large fortunes were made by these selective pirates at the expense of the Spanish, French, and Dutch.
To a degree, the current struggle against the Sandinistas has been privatized, with shadowy organizations using private funds to channel aid to the Contras. Eugene Hasenfus, who parachuted out of the C-123 cargo plane shot down over southern Nicaragua, may well have been a contract worker for one of these organizations--a modern privateer.
His operation does not appear to have been highly professional. Hasenfus was the only man with a parachute; the other three died in the crash. He does not speak Spanish and appears to know nothing about the terrain over which he was operating. The wrecked plane contained all sorts of personal identification, flight plans, and even business cards. It is, of course, in the Sandinistas' propaganda interest to connect the operation directly with the CIA.
The rationale for covert operations is that they provide us with a range of options between doing nothing and sending in the Marines. The problem is that covert operations sometimes fail to remain covert, handing the enemy a psychological and propaganda victory. Covert operations are particularly difficult to conceal in an open society, and the situation is aggravated by our adversary media, which create a situation very different from the one enjoyed by the OSS and MI-6 of World War II.
A major alternative to covert action either by the CIA or by private groups would be open U.S. aid to the Contras. We could close our embassy in Managua, recognize the Contras as the legitimate government, and open Democratic Nicaragua offices in this country. This would be a serious option. Indeed, the only serious option.
COPYRIGHT 1986 National Review, Inc.
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