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Foreign policy, stupid - underlying weaknesses of Bill Clinton's strategies in Haiti, North Korea and other areas - Editorial

National Review,  Nov 7, 1994  

PRESIDENT Clinton has learned, to his evident discomfort, that foreign policy can't be left to the pollsters while he focuses on his domestic agenda. He has been besieged by crises--some made more likely or more difficult by others' perception that he was inattentive or worse.

Mr. Clinton deserves some credit. Israel and Jordan are moving rapidly toward peace. Our Iran policy is sound (see p. 66). And the President's performance in the recent mini-showdown with Saddam Hussein was strong. Saddam's menacing movement of elite Republican Guard troops toward the Kuwaiti border called for an immediate response. The U.S. reaction was impressive; an armada of sea and air power was quickly organized, and Saddam was forced back. Just as skillfully, the Administration got UN support and has managed (so far) to deflect mischievous Russian diplomatic moves designed to lift sanctions in return for Iraqi recognition of Kuwait's borders. Saddam deserves no rewards now; his recognition of Kuwait should be unconditional. In any case, the Administration is right to insist that sanctions continue, inter alia as a restraint on Iraq's clandestine nuclearweapons program.

The bad news is that Saddam's miscalculation was invited by Mr. Clinton's earlier poor performance. In both the North Korean and Haitian episodes, the wimpus ex machina, Jimmy Carter, gave the clear impression of a U.S. Government that shrank from the use of force. Saddam must have figured Mr. Carter would give him at least half of what he wanted. Like JFK between the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, Mr. Clinton stumbled into success--misleading his adversary by weakness beforehand.

More important, the Iraq affair dramatizes the weakness of the Clinton defense policy. The Administration's own doctrine--that we must be able to handle two major regional crises simultaneously--has been undermined by our defense cutbacks; its importance has been underlined by crises in Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, North Korea, and the Gulf. (One of the most important elements in the House Republicans' "Contract with America" was their highlighting of that fact. For too long, the Republicans, spooked by Jim Carville, had been afraid to take up the issue.)

With current successes in both Iraq and Haiti, however, President Clinton's foreign policy seems to be on a roll. But in Haiti even more than in Iraq, it is wise to reserve judgment. The hard part comes now, as the priest/bolshevik Aristide mobilizes the masses to restore his political base, while the forces that despise him remain entrenched and unreconciled. The U.S. troops are sitting on a powder keg: since the U.S. is committed to defending Aristide, we won't be neutral if a civil war breaks out. The ghosts of earlier "peace-keeping" ventures in Lebanon and Somalia (both of which began in deceptively benign circumstances) have not yet been exorcised.

North Korea, also, looks dicey. The Administration has struck a deal with Pyongyang on its nuclear program. We seem to have given up any near-term hope of getting a look at two suspect waste sites that would reveal what weapons-grade nuclear material has already been diverted; the deal is more explicit as to what bribe we can pay (a new nuclear reactor, diplomatic recognition, economic relations) to get the North Koreans to halt further activity (at least at the facilities we know about). The message sent loud and clear to other thugs is that it pays to go nuclear--you'll end up with either the Bomb, or Western largesse, or both.

COPYRIGHT 1994 National Review, Inc.
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