Why is the U.S. weaponizing outer space? Using the Rumsfeld Commission Report as its blueprint, America appears determined to load up the heavens with a technologically advanced—and prohibitively expensive—arsenal, much to the chagrin of enemies and allies alike

THE U.S. IS DRIFTING toward a dangerous commitment to arm outer space, absorb hundreds of billions of dollars of expense at a time when its economy is unstable, and provoke international responses which will reduce, rather than enhance, the nation's security. One solution is an international treaty to ban the weaponization of outer space.

Space "is a difficult, expensive, and potentially dangerous place to operate," one which "requires a lot of technical skill and money to build, launch, and operate satellites," asserts Nancy Gallagher, associate director for research at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. "An increasing number of countries are, or could be, independent space powers," but it would be "ruinously expensive if every country that wants the benefits of space had to manufacture, launch, and operate its own communications, sensing, navigation, and other satellites."

Not only does this suggest the strong need for the sharing of resources but, as Gallagher indicates, there is an equal urgency for rules to facilitate international cooperation on expensive projects and protect legitimate space activities from deliberate interference or attack.

The first initiative that attempted to create such a peaceful regime for outer space was the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Gallagher summarizes its main provisions: Space is free for all to use for peaceful purposes. States cannot employ territorial claims to prevent satellite overflights or appropriate space for exclusive purposes. Space activities must be for the benefit of all countries, in accordance with international law, and respect the interest of other parties.

Just what are the peaceful uses of outer space? The minimal interpretation is that any military use of space is permitted, except those specifically prohibited by the 1967 treaty. In fact, the treaty directly did prohibit stationing weapons of mass destruction in space and using the moon or other celestial bodies for any military purposes, such as establishing bases, conducting maneuvers, or testing weapons.

What has come to be the accepted interpretation of the treaty--or middle-ground position--is that space can be used for military-support activities, such as communication, navigation, weather forecasting, arms control verification, and early wanting. In the Gulf War of 1991 and, more recently, in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. expanded this middle-ground position to include target identification and the use of satellites to direct "smart bombs" to their destinations. Gallagher says the use of such weapons eventually might provide the ability to track, target, and destroy heads of state moving from one secure location to another. Still outside this middle position is direct war-fighting--weapons based in space as antisatellite weapons that can bombard Earth or the atmosphere--and space-based missile defense.

What opened up the use of outer space to "destabilizing" war-fighting, according to Gallagher, was the Rumsfeld Commission Report of 2001, named after then-Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, who "used the growing commercial and military importance of space to U.S. interests ... to warn that, unless the U.S. developed full-scale space control capabilities, it would face a 'Space Pearl Harbor,'" that is, an attack on our entire range of peaceful space assets. This estimate, Gallagher believes, was highly exaggerated, and she notes that the development of U.S. space weapons has been directed more by a desire for dominance--"full spectrum dominance"--than by a need to protect American assets.

Take the diplomatic route

Gallagher also makes clear that disagreements over orbital slots and radio frequency allocations can best be handled diplomatically. Here, she claims, it is not legitimate for the U.S. to reserve large amounts of the radio frequency spectrum for future military activity, depriving other countries of its use for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the U.S. has been reluctant to accept international law concerning guidelines to minimize dangerous space debris, which can interfere with satellites.

In space negotiations, the U.S. is taking the minimalist position that any military uses of outer space which are not prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty are legal. The rest of the world does not agree, Gallagher insists, as evidenced by an annual UN resolution calling for negotiations on new measures to prevent an arms race in space. This resolution receives near-universal support, with only the U.S., Israel, and one or two other small countries abstaining. In addition, the U.S. has been using procedural maneuvers in the UN Conference on Disarmament to block discussions of this question, let alone serious negotiations. Gallagher contends that the U.S. wants the full protection of peaceful space activities provided by the Outer Space Treaty while expanding American military capabilities to control space for its own national advantage. She believes that, by doing so, the U.S. may well degrade the rules making space safe, without having the ability to achieve space dominance.