Timetables and strategies

AS OF PRES. BUSH'S SPEECH at Annapolis in late November 2005, there still was no strategy either to "win" or withdraw from Iraq. In his "Plan for Victory" speech, the President rolled out the same vague objectives that he has stated before ("victory," of course) but failed to make progress markers clear, enunciate any strategy (not that he has to announce one to the enemy), indicate that he knew what a strategy was, or make it known that he understood the U.S., Iraqi, or global premises--the basic facts--of the war.

He did, however, refute (again!) the application of any timetable as being an invitation to the enemy to wait us out. Yet, a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq is not a strategy in any case--nor is it a plan. A proposed timetable is an objective, just like victory, so Sen. John Kerry (D.-Mass.) and Rep. John Murtha (D.-Pa.) have not proposed strategies, either.

A strategy is a hierarchy of options with choices among the options, beginning with a clear definition of the reality that we start with that leads to delineated objectives. A good chess game is an analogy to strategy. A particular opening by the white player leads to a choice of one of several sets of options by the opponent. As play develops, the options diminish and the player takes a closing strategy through a multiplicity of moves to that end. In good chess play, the participants are choosing moves with next options in mind, usually three or four steps ahead.

The Bush Administration has played the war one move at a time, has not made a good assessment of what is on the board, and keeps moving the goal post of objectives: "Capture the Bishop; no, let's get the Queen; no, let's maybe go for the Rook."

Any strategy is built upon a foundation of premises, characterizations of what the "facts" are and how they are configured in relation to each other. In the case of the Iraqi war, there is a persistent mistake that the President insists upon making--that the enemies in Iraq are "terrorists." He constantly describes them as such, probably in an attempt to convince the American and other publics, through framing, that this war in Iraq is a part of the war on terrorism.

In his speech, the President did state that the enemy is a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists affiliated with, or inspired by, Al Qaeda. Within days, though, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was back to describing them all as "terrorists." For an official doctrine--this is published as "The National Strategy Victory in Iraq" on the White House website--the plan is frustratingly vague. At a minimum, we have to recognize the presence of the religion factor (not a Saddam Hussein factor) in the wars on terrorism and in Iraq. If not, we only are fooling ourselves in talking about winning anything.

As long as the various enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are being conflated as terrorists, no coherent strategy to defeat them is possible. The war on terrorism is only a fight to survive until tomorrow. The strategy to defeat insurgents ultimately will be different than the strategy to defeat Islamic radical terrorists--and so will their associated timetables.

Let us not be confused, as the Administration seems to be, by the mixing of the terms timetables, strategies, and plans. A timetable may be applied to a strategy, but it is not necessary. At best, timetables involve sequences--first "A" then "B" then "C"--but would not necessarily have Nov. 7, 2006, or any other date as an absolute deadline.

There are some timetables at work in Iraq already, without considering the objectives of withdrawals by certain dates, or even the choice of strategies. The first is the timetable by which the U.S. military is being ground down by the weight of the war. Recruitment is sluggish; reenlistments are expensive as well as receding; the numbers of wounded are increasing rapidly, with concomitant health care, rehabilitation, and employment requirements; equipment is being used up; morale among the American public is declining; allies and opponents on the global front are becoming more recalcitrant as time goes by. None of these trends can continue endlessly.

Then there is the cost timetable. As demand grows in the implementation of Social Security Part D and other domestic and international programs over the coming year, there will be increasing expectations to stop borrowing money from the Chinese. Even if there never would be any negative repercussions from Chinese debt, that nation cannot realistically fund our debts forever.

A third timetable is the patience of the American people to accept the costs, human and otherwise, of the war in Iraq--especially as distinct from the war against terrorism. Election cycles are the toll booths on the patience highway. These clocks are all ticking no matter what is proposed by war's friends or opponents.