Bush's foreign policy foibles

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION inevitably resorts to name-calling whenever it is in trouble. As The New York Times noted in a March 26 editorial concerning the accusations of former top counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke, "The White House is so thin-skinned and defensive ... that it simply cannot bring itself to join what ought to be a grown-up national conversation of how best to deal with terrorism." This childish exercise, they continue, makes the President appear to be "far more interested in undermining Mr. Clarke's credibility than in addressing the heart of his critique."

Having seen the handwriting on the wall of his 2000 campaign, I opened my March 2001 World Watcher column titled "Terrorism: The 21st Century War," with "Welcome George W. Bush to the presidency and the 21st century. It's a new word with many corners turned at the onset of a new millennium. Among the most critical of corners is in the conduct of war."

I went on to note that 21st century warfare would be changed such that "the weapons of choice have become backpack bombs, computer and biological viruses, and chemicals. Military units are no longer divisions and battalions, but teams of two or 10.... The tactic of choice is now the dramatic explosion or chemical attack that generates fear and destroys economic functions.... Terrorists frequently target office buildings, marketplaces, and transportation facilities, shifting away from detended, secure installations."

The point of repeating this forecast of what an attack would look like--rid how close it was to what occurred on 9/11--is not to congratulate myself, but rather to note that many others besides Clarke were suggesting to the new Bush Administration that a different type of defense had to be conceived, one that moves away from the conventional shields and state-centric constructs of the past. and toward a control of terrorism from nonstate, unconventional actors.

Totally apart from any charges by Clarke, the question is whether there was any shift by the Bush Administration before 9/11. The answer clearly is no! And not much of one afterwards, either. Where was attention focused in that first eight months of the new Administration? My next World Watcher dealing with the President's overseas outlook was in September 2001, just before the 9/11 attacks. Titled "Bush's Foreign Policy: Just Say No!" it listed the instances in which the new Republican elite in Washington had withdrawn from international cooperation and overturned policies that had been set by Pres. Bill Clinton. The latter efforts--not fighting ten'ofism--had become the obsession of the Bush government. It was a "Not Clinton" foreign policy.

Even after 9/11, little really changed. In May 2003, I wrote the colunto "Bush at War: Tactics but No Strategy," contending that the war in Iraq and other pieces of his foreign policy were little more than firefighting, taken as they come and coordinated only as a crusade. The Administration spent time, effort, money, and attention to resurrect the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD or Star Wars), under an assumption that a great threat was posed by countries that might be able to throw missiles at us from long distances. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made much of his intent to revise completely the American war machine technologically, but did little to alter its purpose--that is, to fight conventional ground wars.

The most significant lack of change in 2001 was the failure to control Israel and remove it from its position of centrality in American policy. The inability of the U.S. government (Democrats or Republicans) to see the connection between the Palestinian cause and the motivations of Islamic radicals to strike at the U.S. is one of the most stultifying limitations of an independent American foreign policy. Not only has the Bush Administration not found a solution to this most critical of global issues, it has not even addressed it.

Among many ex post facto arguments for the invasion of Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and others have maintained that Iraq could become the basis of expansion of democracy in the Arab world. This would have been a worthy and farseeing policy if only it had been presented as such before the invasion---and applied to our allies as well as our enemies. Exempting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from the need for democracy contradicts both image and effort.

The war against terrorism never can be won until it is understood what that war is. The Bush Administration reluctantly undertook any war at all against terrorism and then it was--and is--a war against terrorisis, not terrorism. They can kill or capture millions of terrorists and still have made no headway against terrorism. The terrorism war has to he fought at its origins, at the point of creation of terrorists. If conservatives cannot understand that suicide bombers are born of poverty and deprivation--not because they 'hate freedom'--at minimum they need to comprehend that religious radicalism is where minds are made.