Why are we in Iraq?

OVER 35 years ago, few could give a persuasive answer to the question: Why are we in Vietnam? That simple question contained a series of more vexing ones: How do we define winning? What would be gained by it? What would be the costs of such a victory? What American interests and what enduring values were we fighting for? The Johnson Administration could not answer them to the satisfaction of a growing number of citizens. Consequently, the public lost its taste for the enterprise, forced Lyndon Johnson out of office, supported Richard Nixon's gradual withdrawal, and hardly raised a voice in the face of an eventual humiliating retreat in 1975.

No international involvement that requires the sacrifice of blood and treasure, regardless of the scope, can be sustained in a democratic society unless such questions can be answered intelligently and persuasively. Pres. George W. Bush must not repeat the mistakes of LBJ, or he will suffer roughly the same fate. Bush does not have the rhetorical gifts of Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, or even Bill Clinton. His language is unadorned, and, in televised interviews, he often is repetitious and halting in his responses. Nonetheless, be has a case to make. and it is essential that he find a way to make it.

When weapons inspector David Kay--who resigned Jan. 24, 2004--concluded that there were no stock-piles of chemical and biological weapons when the U.S. invaded Iraq, the Bush Administration failed to give an immediate and effective response. Yet, the case was there to be made. The rationale for the war and the persistence in the policing effort were not dependent upon finding large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Saddam Hussein's hands. In his October, 2003, report to Congress and later, Kay reported his inspectors had found plenty of disturbing evidence that had been concealed from Hans Blix's UN inspectors: a clandestine network within the Iraq Intelligence Service that had equipment suitable for research in the production of chemical mad biological weapons, as well as evidence that the renovation of a nuclear program was in its early stages. Kay testified to Congress that Saddam, by maintaining WMD programs and activities, was in clear violation of UN Resolution 1441 and that he undoubtedly had the intention to resume the initiative. Blix's investigators never would have uncovered this information as long as Saddam was in power. It was disclosed to Kay's team by Iraqi scientists who no longer feared for their lives if they were open with inspectors. In other words, UN inspections, if allowed to continue in the absence of war, could have given Saddam a clean bill of health.

Then what would have happened? As Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy Berger predicted in December, 1998, Saddam would have rammed to his familiar pattern of Iraqi defiance, leading to American mobilization, followed by Iraqi capitulation, subsequent to another round of Iraqi defiance until the will of the U.S. and the United Nations was worn down. The Clinton Administration had given up on the containment of Saddam when it signed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. The bill, which had overwhelming bipartisan support, stated, "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime." It was the consensus that Saddam, whether he had stockpiles of WMD at his immediate disposal or not, was a danger to the region and the peace of the world. Kay's assertion that there never were any stockpiles of WMD in Iraq in 2003 changes nothing. As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it: "if the international community had not acted in time, if sanctions had been withdrawn ... it was just a matter of time before that intention, capability, delivery system, and all the other wherewithal he had would have produced the stockpile that would have threatened his own people again, threatened the region, and threatened the world."

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, added additional urgency to that objective. The lethal combination of terrorist fanatics, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction endanger all civilized societies and the peace of the world. Iraq, as Kay testified, was a place where terrorists were passing through unimpeded. With the loose control that apparently existed over Iraq's WMD programs, he concluded, "Iraq was a dangerous place ... even more dangerous than we thought."

We are staying in Iraq to prevent it from once again becoming such a precarious place. The best disinfectant against terrorism, religious fanaticism, and madman dictators is a stable and prosperous democracy. The Middle East, with all its oil riches, never has seen such a thing. The creation of one in Iraq is the most important and difficult project the U.S. has undertaken since the Marshall Plan. It will not be completed quickly or easily. We are not doing this as a simple act of altruism. The deadly alignment of a rogue state in possession of WMDs, willing to consort with terrorists, could strike at our vital interests, especially in the Middle East. Another strongman or a fanatical Islamic regime in Iraq would re-create the nightmare of Saddam.