Post-Cold War development of United Kingdom joint air command and control capability

Air & Space Power Journal,  Winter, 2004  by Redvers T.N. Thompson

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The author believes that it was fortuitous timing (if that can be said of any conflict) that at this point in the RAF's restructuring, the Balkans erupted once more, in the guise of Kosovo, with the resulting execution of Op Allied Force. Without addressing the extensive number of lessons that fell from this operation, it is sufficient to state that many were related to the C2 of this primarily air operation, and many lessons were carry-overs from Desert Storm some nine years earlier. In the context of this article, principal among these was that the assumption that a medium-scale air operation could be executed just by the elements of an AOC (i.e., combat plans and combat ops) was proven to be erroneous. While undertaken with the best military endeavour by all those personnel involved, the consequential expansion of the Vicenza AOC into an operational-level JFACHQ was a case study in ad hoc crisis management. Only after the belated formation of a strategy division was a form of a joint air operations plan (JAOP) developed and signed off by the CFACC on the 40th day of air operations along with the first air operations directive. Similarly, it was to be another five to 10 days before a guidance, apportionment, and targeting process was established. Across the whole range of HQ staff cells (A1-A9), augmentors were being thrown in together, often without cadre personnel or identified procedures to follow.

As a result of his experiences at Vicenza, the JFACHQ ProjO argued that the SDR remit would only be met with the provision of a core JFACHQ and not just a core AOC. The need for the "command" element of C2 of any JRRF air element was highlighted, along with the likely need, given the understandable political realities of delaying decisions to commit forces, of air C2 elements being able to "hit the ground running." It was also identified that C2 augmentors require a core cadre framework of personnel around which to form and establish standard operating procedures (SOP) to reference. As well as identifying deficiencies, a positive highlight was identified as being that the RAF's ability to provide even a limited number of experienced and trained personnel to the coalition AOC (from Air Warfare Centre, UK CAOC, and other RAF elements) had enabled a significant degree of influence to be exercised within the Allied Force air C2 processes. These "lessons" manifested themselves in a November 1999 paper on the proposed structure and establishment of the UK JFACHQ, which identified the following main lines to take:

1. UK JFACHQ is absolutely pivotal to STC provision of effective expeditionary air power capability.

2. Proposed structure and establishment provide expertise in all essential C2 areas but at skeletal or digital manning levels: any "thinning" will result in the loss of core expertise and capability.

3. National 82-man UK CAOC to be replaced by 66-man UK JFACHQ.

4. UK JFACHQ should be viewed as STC's C2 "jewel in the crown": requires same priority in manning as other front-line R1 operational units. (12)