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A century of air and space power - Flight Lines
Air & Space Power Journal, Winter, 2003 by Anthony C. Cain
AS THE WORLD celebrates its first century of powered flight, the significance of the Wright brothers contribution is evident in nearly every facet of modern-day life. Aviation's influence on the world's economies, agriculture, research, construction, medicine, recreation, and a myriad of other activities is so pervasive that we do not even recognize it until we feel its absence. As if the images of destruction--bombed-out Second World War cities, the bombed-and-shelled Chechen city of Grozny, and more recently the ruins of the World Trade Center--were not striking enough, the near silence in America's skies during the week following the 9/11 attacks was a stark reminder of the psychological and economic effects that occur when aviation turns from benign to lethal purposes.
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Within 11 years of the Wrights' first flight--a flight that lasted 12 seconds and covered 120 feet--the world entered the First World War and used aircraft for the first time in combat. Air transport began in little more than 25 years after that 12-second flight, and soon routine flights were scheduled between developed nations. Before 40 years of aviation history had passed, the world was engulfed in the Second World War. That war, characterized by dominant airpower, was brought to a sudden end by the first use of an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. During the following 10 years, the marriage of airpower with nuclear weaponry gave the Cold War its frightful character. States gradually acquired the ability to annihilate each other from the air in a matter of hours--long before Second World War-style land forces could arrive on the battlefield. As another decade passed, competition for air dominance shifted from a main emphasis on terrestrial-constrained systems to one that included space platforms designed to observe, collect, and exploit the regions beyond Earth's atmosphere. As Cold War competitions disintegrated, air and space power experienced another revolution predicated on global reach, rapid mobility, pervasive intelligence, and precision-strike capabilities. Today, no rational state would consider initiating a war against its neighbors without first calculating the relative advantages that it and its allies have over competitors in terms of air and space power.
This brief review of how quickly and significantly air and space power has transformed our world should encourage professionals to think about its probable influence during the next 100 years. Our profession's potential is boundless; the scope, pace, and character of air and space power that will emerge--as we tap into that potential--are largely a function of the goals we set and the energy with which we pursue them. The recent superlative performances in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom justifiably fill airmen with a sense of pride and accomplishment. Although some may view these recent successes as the logical accomplishment of visions cast by early airpower theorists, potential adversaries should recognize that we are not now content to rest on our laurels. The future holds a special challenge, and in many ways we face that future with a blank slate, as did the Wright brothers and members of the US Army Air Service, the US Army Air Corps, and the early US Air Force as they defined air and space power's character at key developmental points in our history. Presently, several trends bear careful study if we are to step into the second century of powered flight with an understanding and a vision of how to proceed.
The emerging security context appears to be characterized by the pervasive threats of poverty, crime, terrorism, and rogue states, but for the time being, we face no peer competitor who could alter the status quo of the international system. This creates exciting opportunities for the US air and space power leaders, visionaries, and adventurers who will expand our capabilities. Innovations will likely occur in technological, organizational, and doctrinal areas--all of which have the potential to transform how we view our profession--so that we become more effective at employing air and space power in support of national security objectives.
Many potential adversaries recognize that they do not have the resources--economic, scientific, and social--to compete directly with US advantages in air and space power. Thus, their plans for a future conflict will increasingly employ asymmetric characteristics. Rather than building fighter forces to contend for air and space superiority, these competitors will concentrate on fielding active and passive systems designed to negate or bypass our overwhelming capabilities in these areas. Instead of fielding sophisticated space-based systems, these adversaries will concentrate on ground-based space-denial systems. US air and space power, in coordination with other joint capabilities, will have to adapt and evolve to counter each new asymmetric threat.
The memories of airmen suffering in North Vietnamese prisons permanently scarred our culture to the point that airmen will, correctly, go to great lengths to reduce the risks to aircrews as they execute their missions. The public's concern for casualties and prisoners of war has also caused national leaders to choose strategies that consider and, when possible, mitigate those risks. One logical outcome of these trends may lead us to question the utility of manned cockpits. Air and space combat capabilities could gradually evolve from manned platforms to remotely piloted vehicles as sophisticated defenses proliferate, as rules of engagement and risk tolerances become more stringent, and as national leaders demand greater involvement in mission-execution decisions. This could be a painful transition for a force with a legacy of warriors rising to do battle with the enemy; the alternative could be analogous to the First World War cavalry force that spent much of the war waiting for a breakout that never came. Trench warfare, machine guns, and artillery made horse cavalry ineffective for that war--new weapons in future wars may do the same for manned combat aircraft.
