The Air Force Office of Special Investigations: postured for the future

Christine E. Williamson

PRIOR TO THE terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the majority of Air Force members knew little about one of the most critical mission priorities of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI): providing threat information to Air Force commanders. Since its inception in 1948, the AFOSI has kept commanders, whether at home or deployed abroad, apprised of threat information that could adversely affect the mission or safety of Air Force personnel. Today, the command has become substantially more integrated into joint ventures as well as law-enforcement and intelligence communities in order to maintain a global perspective and protect Air Force resources in an ever-evolving threat environment.

With the onset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the counterintelligence (CI) and antiterrorism (AT) missions of the AFOSI garnered attention at all levels of Air Force leadership. Although they are fundamental aspects of the AFOSI mission, CI and AT for the most part remain unknown to the people they protect. Col Kevin J. Jacobsen, commander of the AFOSI's Expeditionary Field Investigations Squadron in Southwest Asia during the combat phase of Iraqi Freedom, summed up the postcombat scenario in the Iraqi theater of operations: "This is an OSI-style war, dependent on source networks and threat collection and analysis." (1) This crucial element of the AFOSI mission has never been more apparent to Air Force commanders than it is today, and it will continue to serve as a key element of the Air Force war-fighting team of the future.

Evolution of an Antiterrorism Program

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political scientists predicted a new multipolar world--one devoid of the balance of power that had existed for almost five decades between the world's two superpowers. The AFOSI agent of the Cold War era focused on threats from foreign-intelligence services such as those of the Soviet Union and East Germany. Certainly, this was a difficult task, but the lines were drawn much more clearly with respect to who might try to sabotage Air Force assets or recruit Air Force spies. The current climate, in which the United States stands as the world's only superpower, has seen the emergence of rogue nations whose opposition to America and its policies facilitates the harboring of terrorists and support of their causes.

Detecting emerging terrorist threats and their potential impact on Air Force operations became an essential part of the AFOSI's function by the 1970s, as the command's agents in Iran saw their mission evolve from uncovering foreign-intelligence threats to deterring terrorist ambitions against Americans serving in that country. Venturing into relatively new territory, those agents envisioned the changing threat environment as the shah's popularity waned and US service members became targets for assassination. With little policy to guide them and few AT programs in existence, they--along with a support element from Headquarters AFOSI--successfully developed an aggressive AT program in the throes of the Islamic revolution as the Department of Defense's (DOD) only CI agency in the country. (2) Their model, the genesis of the AFOSI's AT program, provided a concrete foundation for current AT operations. (3)

This program progressed during the 1980s and 1990s as the rise in international terrorism posed a threat to US forces. After the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the AFOSI created its Antiterrorism Specialty Team to provide a rapid-response CI/AT capability wherever Air Force commanders deployed. The team's agents, who receive training similar to that of special forces, were among the first US military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan at the onset of Enduring Freedom. The constant rotation between training and deployment gave this team invaluable experience and provided key lessons that the command has used to improve its support in a deployed environment. The Antiterrorism Specialty Team model has proved successful and has been benchmarked by a few other federal law-enforcement agencies. Furthermore, after the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, the AFOSI emerged as a key figure in the joint venture to establish force-protection detachments, designed to provide AT support to US forces transiting high-threat areas that have no US military infrastructure. Comprised of special agents and analysts from the AFOSI, Army Military Intelligence, and Navy Criminal Investigative Service, these detachments are located in such countries as Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Djibouti. (4)

Response to the 9/11 Attacks

In the wake of 9/11, AFOSI agents worldwide went on heightened alert, establishing operations around-the-clock to keep all levels of Air Force leadership apprised of information as events unfolded. At the Pentagon, these agents played a crucial role as part of the FBI team assembled to process the crime scene. Forensic and technical agents utilized their invaluable skills to identify and photograph crucial pieces of evidence. Agents at Headquarters AFOSI at Andrews AFB, Maryland, and at AFOSI Field Investigations Region Four, Randolph AFB, Texas, quickly determined the status of foreign nationals receiving Air Force training and checked their names against watch lists of terrorists. AFOSI agents in major cities across the nation linked into the FBI/Joint Terrorism Task Forces to identify potential threats to installations in the continental United States, and agents overseas conducted liaison at the highest levels of host-nation governments to assure their awareness of known threat information. (5)

Despite the immediate and collective response to the worst terrorist attack in the nation's history, AFOSI senior leadership found the command in a situation not unlike that of other agencies across the country who were caught off guard, not expecting an attack of such magnitude. The command responded by preparing its more than 1,500 agents worldwide for immediate action, but the events of 9/11 brought another issue to the forefront: how to better posture the AFOSI to support Air Force war fighters in an age of transnational terrorism. Consequently, the command developed three programs for successfully detecting, neutralizing, and deterring threats to the Air Force and other DOD resources: (1) the Investigations, Collections, and Operations Nexus (ICON); (2) the Talon program; and (3) "Eagle Eyes."

The ICON seeks to improve the integration of law-enforcement and intelligence information and offer analysis that will better connect the dots, eliminating intelligence gaps that plague other agencies without both CI and law-enforcement components. (6) Talon, designated the official DOD threat-reporting tool by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in 2003, provides a vehicle for reporting raw criminal and intelligence data to commanders if such information represents a credible threat. (7) The mandated reporting of this information within one hour in order to accelerate the process of development and analysis helps bridge the gap between law enforcement and intelligence; moreover, it puts rapid, refined, and actionable force-protection information in the hands of Air Force leaders at all levels. (8) Eagle Eyes, developed as a defensive AT program with the idea that every Airman is a sensor, educates troops, civilian workers, family members, off-base merchants, and communities surrounding Air Force installations in matters involving possible terrorist surveillance and attack planning. (9)

Reevaluating Mission Priorities

After 9/11 the AFOSI made a priority of putting agents on the ground in places like Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan, to collect threat data and determine vulnerabilities to Air Force people and resources before they arrived. Diverting personnel to support deployments has now become a permanent part of the command's structure. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2004, the AFOSI has deployed approximately 450 agents, almost one-fourth of its current total, to support Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. (10) Deployment of such a large percentage of the agent force, coupled with the fact that they go to several locations not previously utilized by the US military, created particular challenges for the AFOSI's leadership and planners. However, the command had to adapt as Air Force requirements evolved to supply deployed commanders with the threat information they needed. (11)

CI services to the Air Force increased exponentially after 9/11 and have steadily grown since the commencement of Iraqi Freedom in 2003, reflecting the immense focus the command has placed on its CI/AT mission since the terrorist attacks (fig. 1). CI services entail an array of operations, including protective measures for key Air Force and DOD officials, vulnerability assessments, analytical products, participation in Air Force and joint exercises, and threat-awareness briefings (fig. 2). The AFOSI increased its total protective CI services to Air Force commanders by over 100 percent from 2000 (1,430 services) to 2004 (3,014 services). (12) Specifically, AT services nearly tripled, from 231 in 2000 to 623 by 2004, including a spike to 736 in 2003. CI analysis and assessments increased exponentially from 73 documented reports in 2002 to an estimated 1,531 by 200433 Analytical reports include the Blue Line, a publication that provides a daily snapshot of threat information; in-depth CI notes, focusing on a specific threat or vulnerability in a region or country; and threat assessments for particular areas where Air Force assets may deploy. However, this represents just one piece of the overall AFOSI mission. The command also sought to find a way to use the same number of resources to fight the global war on terrorism while simultaneously ensuring good order, discipline, and the safety of Air Force personnel and family members on Air Force installations. (14)

[FIGURES 1&2 OMITTED]

Becoming an Integral Part of the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Posture

To better prepare agents and support personnel for deployment, AFOSI planners and leaders recognized the need to configure them into Air Force deployment orders and operational plans and to better integrate into the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) rotation cycle. Thus, on 1June 2002, prompted by an abrupt 400 percent increase in AFOSI deployment requirements with the onset of Enduring Freedom, the command joined the AEF rotation to ensure that agents became part of the contingent of deployed Air Force war fighters. (15) The change reflected a historical turnabout in the command's approach to deployments, which it had formerly conducted independently of standard Air Force systems because of the nature of agents' missions in a deployed environment. Today, agents find themselves better prepared for projected deployments because their assignment to an AEF rotation cycle ensures the completion of proper training and other requirements.

Iraqi Freedom and Beyond: Postured for the Future

Before Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, AFOSI agents had already staged at Kuwait City International Airport and prepared to enter Iraq before the Air Force established bases within the interior of the country. These personnel comprised some of the first US forces at Tallil Air Base, near Basra, and at Baghdad International Airport. A month later, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence named the AFOSI as executive agent for CI support to the Coalition Provisional Authority.16 Despite the official rescinding of that duty in November 2003, the command's CI support has remained an essential part of the CI mission in Iraq. AFOSI agents participated in some of the key operations conducted in postwar Iraq, including protective support to senior leadership in the Iraqi theater of operations. (17) More importantly, though, the AFOSI deployment system has evolved as the needs of the Air Force have changed to ensure that the command can support Air Force war fighters in the future.

In the AFOSI's strategic plan of 2003, Brig Gen Leonard E. Patterson, commander, stated that the challenges facing the Air Force and the United States in the twenty-first century would be characterized by regional instability fueled by ethnic, cultural, territorial, and resource rivalries. As the DOD evolves from a Cold War mentality and adapts to the complex threats inherent in future operating environments, the AFOSI is also adapting to assure its alignment with the Air Force's strategic plan as well as with other key national-strategy documents, including the National Military Strategy of the United States, Joint Vision 2020, and Air Force Vision 2020. (18)

A crucial element in achieving the AFOSI vision--to become the world's best investigative agency in the world's best air and space force---calls for the command's integration not only with Air Force partners but also with sister services, as well as federal and international law-enforcement agencies (fig. 3). The AFOSI operates in tandem with joint partners and other agencies to ensure that it has the most up-to-date threat information for Air Force leaders. (19) As part of that vision and at the heart of the OSI strategic perspective (thereby at the forefront of the AFOSI's contribution to total Air Force capabilities), the command's core competencies include providing (1) timely, specialized investigations; (2) collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant threat information; and (3) specialized support to sensitive Air Force projects, technologies, and capabilities. (20)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

As part of its outlook for the future, the AFOSI's operational goal is to detect threats and give Air Force commanders early warning capabilities as well as actionable investigative products that enable them to protect their people while preserving good order and discipline. The command can realize this goal by continuously developing the AFOSI ICON and integrating with the DOD's overarching CI policy. Utilization of the ICON will allow agents to detect and counter threats through investigations and the effective use of information technology, followed by rapid dissemination of threat information when and where Air Force commanders need it. (21) As a key member of the joint CI environment, the AFOSI will help assess CI implications for the current DOD planning model and for the resulting or enhanced capabilities of the future. Simultaneously, the command will serve as an integral part of the goal set by the DOD's CI community of developing CI capabilities and implementing them, both in a continuous state of warfare and outside traditional threat definitions--the "new normalcy" of the DOD's operating environment. (22)

Conclusion

Since its inception in 1948, the AFOSI has operated behind the scenes to detect and deter threats to the Air Force. Once known to Air Force members only for its criminal and fraud investigations, the command has seen its CI/AT role evolve with changing threats to the Air Force and become prevalent in the post-9/11 operating environment. The vision and foresight demonstrated by the AFOSI's leadership in developing a CI/AT program over the past three decades have allowed the command to adapt to new, more complex threats and have helped posture the AFOSI as the eyes and ears of the Air Force war fighter, today and tomorrow.

Notes

(1.) Col Kevin J. Jacobsen, interview by Christine E. Williamson, 15 April 2004, in History, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 2003, 9, 11, 20.

(2.) Christine E. Williamson, "OSI in Iran, 1966-1979" (Andrews AFB, MD: AFOSI History Office, 2004), v-vi.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) See History, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 2000-2003.

(5.) History, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 2001, 109.

(6.) Brig Gen Leonard E. Patterson, "ICON, Talon, Eagle Eyes: OSI Develops New Programs in the Aftermath of Sept. 11," Global Reliance, March-April 2002, 10.

(7.) Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, to AFOSI/CC, memorandum, 15 April 2003.

(8.) Patterson, "ICON, Talon, Eagle Eyes," 10.

(9.) Ibid.

(10.) "Deployed Numbers for OIF" (Andrews AFB, MD: AFOSI Readiness Division, Directorate of Operations, December 2004), 1.

(11.) Christine E. Williamson, "The Evolving Role of the OSI Deployed Agent Force," Global Reliance, November-December 2004, 23.

(12.) "OSI CI Support" (Andrews AFB, MD: Headquarters AFOSI Data Integrity Division, Directorate of Plans, 22 September 2004), 1.

(13.) Ibid.

(14.) "The Increase in AFOSI's CI Support since 9/11" (Andrews AFB, MD: Headquarters AFOSI Data Integrity Division, Directorate of Plans, 1 October 2003), 1.

(15.) Maj Mike Richmond, "OSI Gets Expeditionary," Global Reliance, November-December 2002, 4.

(16.) Office of the Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence to AFOSI/CC, memorandum, 15 April 2003.

(17.) Office of the Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence to AFOSI/CC, memorandum, 1 November 2003.

(18.) "AFOSI Strategic Plan" (Andrews AFB, MD: Performance Management Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters AFOSI, 2003), 1-2.

(19.) Ibid., 2.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Ibid.

(22.) Office of the Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence, Department of Defense CI Strategy, 2005-2008 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2004), 1.

Christine E. Williamson, The author is command historian, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Andrews AFB, Maryland.

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