A vision for the national guard

Joint Force Quarterly,  Dec, 2004  by H. Steven Blum

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Despite assaults on U.S. citizens and facilities abroad and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the warnings of many within the intelligence and defense communities that the Nation was vulnerable to terrorist attack were insufficient to force major institutional change--or significantly increase preparedness--before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Tentative steps had been taken at Federal, state, and local levels. The Department of Defense (DOD) had funded the formation of joint weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams within the National Guard beginning in fiscal year 1998. These units were designed to provide direct assistance to civilian emergency responders in the event of a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack on the homeland. While they are few in number and were still in their operational infancy in 2001, it was one of these units, the New York National Guard [2.sup.d] Civil Support Team (WMD), that became the first organized unit of any military service or component to arrive at Ground Zero on the morning of September 11, sampling the air to ensure than no biological or chemical contaminants were present and providing critical communications capabilities. Air National Guard fighters conducted air patrols against further attacks in New York and Washington and across the Nation. Homeland defense--the original mission of our militia forebears when they first settled this continent--had returned to the forefront at the dawning of a new century, demanding that the National Guard restructure in response.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush saw the need to transform the Guard for maximum utility in the war against terrorism and ensure that it remains ready, reliable, essential, and accessible. While many of the transformational tasks facing the military are service specific--particularly the need to revamp the lengthy mobilization and demobilization process the Army requires of its Guard and Reserve units--the most critical changes in the National Guard will be in the joint arena. In a memo sent July 30, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld tasked the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) to instill a greater joint focus in the Guard and improve DOD access to its capabilities. This article summarizes the course the bureau will follow. It is the joint vision for the future of the National Guard.

A Joint Bureau

We are transforming our headquarters and capabilities to shape the future. We must organize to operate in peacetime and fight in wartime in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Federal body that administers the funds and controls (but does not command) the Army and Air National Guard of the several states, territories, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and District of Columbia, needed to be organized and operate like a true joint staff. A provisional reorganization of the NGB staff on July 1, 2003 was initiated to facilitate coordination with the Joint Staff and the staffs of the various combatant commanders. We flattened and streamlined the organization, aligning staff functions and responsibilities with those of the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders, and for the first time had Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers attached to the bureau. Secretary Rumsfeld ratified these initial steps in his July 30 memo to CNGB. A formal concept and implementation plan for this reorganization is currently under review. It asks that NGB be organized under a joint table of distribution, with a limited number of billets designated as joint duty assignments on the joint duty assignment list--to be filled by active component officers from all the services, or the Joint Duty Assignment--Reserve (IDA-R)--to be filled by Reserve component officers nominated by each of the services' Reserve components. When approved by DOD, NGB will be capable of achieving full operational capability as a joint bureau.

The proposed changes are required by the new national security environment, particularly as it relates to homeland security and civil support. They will be additive to the existing missions that the Army and Air National Guard perform for the services--not in lieu of those missions.

Some observers are concerned that seeking an expanded relationship with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff diminishes the Guard's utility to the services. Such fears are unfounded; greater jointness can only improve the Guard's ability to serve alongside its active duty counterparts in any contingency that may arise. Providing trained, ready, and equipped forces as a Federal Reserve of the Army and the Air Force remains the core mission. The National Guard Bureau will not seek to reduce or eliminate its statutory responsibilities in this realm as it seeks greater relevance in the joint arena.

The Guard is committed to transformation. We will aggressively work with the Army and Air Force to integrate into their transformation plans. Simultaneously, we are transforming the Guard into a more joint and effective organization from top to bottom to meet the needs of elected and uniformed state and Federal leaders.