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Information operations as a core competency
Joint Force Quarterly, Dec, 2004 by Christopher J. Lamb
An overly broad conceptualization, as represented in the original 13 activity categories, dilutes its focus on human and automated decisionmaking. It also tends to divorce IO from the three primary operational information objectives of greatest importance to the warfighter enumerated in the three IO functions: controlling adversary perceptions, plans, and communications while protecting the same for U.S. forces. In contrast, the five core areas identified in the roadmap are operational, interrelated, and essential to information dominance.
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The core capabilities are increasingly interdependent. At first blush "soft" military sciences such as PSYOP and deception might seem unrelated to the more technical EW and CNO, but such is not the case. For example, PSYOP can support EW by advertising U.S. attack capability to discourage enemy electronic surveillance, and PSYOP platforms can conduct electronic attack. In turn, EW supports PSYOP units by suppressing enemy efforts to disrupt their broadcasts. It also supports OPSEC with disciplined emissions control plans to better manage a commander's electromagnetic signatures and military deception by selectively jamming, interfering, or electronic masking. Other examples, including those involving CNO, could be offered. The point is that these five disciplines are related and their interdependency is increasing, especially as military use of the electromagnetic spectrum grows. Thus they are best thought of as an integrated set of disciplines.
Supporting and Related Capabilities
Like all core military competencies, information operations cannot succeed without diverse supporting capabilities, which are recognized in the IO roadmap.
* Capabilities such as physical security, information assurance, counterintelligence, and physical attack contribute to IO planning objectives. However, like many supporting capabilities, such as logistics and surveillance and reconnaissance, they serve other core competencies and do not require planned contact with the enemy to produce effects.
* Public affairs and civil military operations remain related activities. By pursuing their own important objectives, these capabilities help promulgate U.S. intentions to both friends and enemies, complementing information operations generally and PSYOP in particular. They can encourage support for friendly military endeavors, an objective PSYOP can promote as well, especially when employed to support U.S. public diplomacy as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines.
* PSYOP can use more aggressive tactics, techniques, and procedures to directly discourage and dissuade enemies than the public and civil affairs disciplines. In a world where global communications are the norm, the likelihood that its messages will be replayed to a broader audience, including the American public, means PSYOP needs defined boundaries. The roadmap limits its support to military endeavors (exercises, deployments, and operations) in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments--for example, when enemies are part of the equation.
