Responding to chemical and biological incidents at home

Joint Force Quarterly,  Dec, 2004  by Thomas X. Hammes

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It is 5:30 on a cool, still evening in Washington. There is a slight haze due to the rush hour traffic. It is getting dark and a thermal inversion is holding the haze in place. A tanker truck pulls to a downtown curb. The driver turns on the flashers, exits, and walks up the street, apparently in search of a pay phone to call for help. He is never seen again.

Two men get out on the other side of the vehicle. One moves to the valves extending from the tank and quickly begins opening them. An officer at a nearby Federal building comes out to see what is going on. The second man shoots him repeatedly. With the sounds of the shots still echoing, both men run south. They don't get far before falling to the sidewalk gasping.

Pedestrians and drivers begin coughing and collapsing in an expanding circle around the truck. The odor of chlorine fills the air. Everyone is trying to escape, but the gas is expanding and being drawn into vehicle and building ventilation systems.

9-1-1 calls from cells phones and surrounding buildings flood the switchboards. More alarming to inbound firefighters, the calls are coming from many floors of the buildings. As the responders close on the scene, they find the streets blocked with wrecked, stalled, and abandoned vehicles.

City fire and emergency services would be overwhelmed in the above scenario. The casualties could number in the hundreds and be scattered through numerous multistory buildings and vehicles. Simply conducting a methodical search for casualties would require a major effort. Chlorine gas is heavier than air. Drawn into buildings by ventilation systems, it could form pockets, particularly in stairwells and other low points. Thus every rescuer would need individual protective equipment to move safely. DC Fire has made major strides in preparing for such an emergency, yet like all city fire departments it simply cannot afford the necessary manpower and equipment.

On Scene in Two Hours

Fortunately, DC Fire has trained with and can call on the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). Its 117 marines and sailors, on 1-hour alert, can be on scene within 2 hours. Working under the direction of DC Incident Command System, they can increase the city's ability to conduct rescue and mass decontamination operations. If the initial force is insufficient, an additional 200 marines and sailors can be dispatched within 4 hours. Since CBIRF trains full-time and has protective equipment to conduct three entries per person, the unit can conduct sustained operations. Unfortunately, it is the only Department of Defense (DOD) unit that provides a major search, extraction, and decontamination capability.

First responders know what is required to react to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack. They must execute mitigation and rescue. Mitigation consists of both stopping the release of more agent and cordoning off the area to limit victims. Rescue consists of entering the contaminated area, finding victims, extracting them, decontaminating them, and treating them. Both tasks must be accomplished quickly to minimize casualties. The final task, recovery, is not one for first responders; it will be a time-consuming process better handled by contractors.

Most major municipalities can at least mitigate the effects of a chemical or high-yield explosive attack. They have well-trained hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams that can stop additional release. Their police departments can identify the contaminated area by observing people in the vicinity. They can then expand the area to allow for contamination migration and establish the cordon. In addition, many cities have basic radiation detection instruments and can establish a cordon in radiological or nuclear attacks. Biological attacks unfold more slowly, and mitigation is primarily thorough identification and quarantine using preventative health and medical experts.

Unfortunately, municipalities cannot conduct the large-scale search, rescue, decontamination, and treatment needed in such an attack. Even the Tokyo Fire Department, one of the best trained and equipped in the world, was overwhelmed by a badly executed sarin gas attack on their subway system. Cities simply cannot afford to keep the large number of trained personnel on alert to respond to such an incident.

Examining the sequence of events after a CBRNE event reveals the gap in resources. Obviously, local authorities will provide the initial response. In the case of a CBRNE event, they will immediately call in all off-duty first responders. Even then, only HAZMAT-trained and equipped responders can safely enter such an environment. Given the intense physical effort required to conduct mass personnel rescue and decontamination, the on-duty shift will exhaust its people--and more importantly its on-truck supply of protective equipment--within hours. Currently, their only source of relief will be the off-duty shifts using whatever equipment is available in ready local stocks. The best local response forces can sustain is 8 to 16 hours in a contaminated environment, even drawing on robust mutual aid agreements.