Relearning counterinsurgency warfare

Parameters,  Spring, 2004  by Robert R. Tomes

• E-mail
• Print
• Link

The move from political intelligence gathering to operational intelligence gathering and the guiding of forces into contact with the enemy involves more than merely expanding the intelligence organization. As discussed above, it requires adapting to the enemy and "developing new methods" to deal with problems as they arise. (36) In simpler terms this means maintaining flexibility, seizing the initiative whenever possible, and effectively coordinating the military, political, economic, and social aspects of the conflict. The army must be involved in the intelligence gathering and analysis aspects of the counterinsurgency effort from the beginning, Kitson argues, "because in the later stages of the campaign when [the army's] units are deployed, it will rely very greatly on the information provided by the intelligence organization for the success of its operations." (37) One facet of building a successful intelligence organization is the use of local assets, which becomes especially true when establishing a psychological-operations organization.

How can the new regime's counterinsurgency forces be educated? First, they must become attuned to the environment, both the cognitive as well as the physical. Second, commanders must learn to optimize resources for each phase in the campaign, including the integration of civil and military activities. Third, commanders must know how to direct and coordinate all resources under their command. Finally, education and training must reach all levels of the organization. (38)

Students of ongoing efforts in Iraq will benefit from Kitson's comparison of counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping. Fundamentally, the two share "a surprising similarity in the outward forms of many of the techniques involved." (39) Both require the combination and efficient integration of military and nonmilitary resources, although peacekeeping arguably requires greater attention to the political aspects of the operation. While the use of force is typical of a campaign against insurgents, there are advantages in avoiding the use of force in peacekeeping operations and focusing on political means. Kitson suggests that the peacekeeper must develop an image of being an honest broker, which enhances the ability of the peacekeeper to negotiate and if necessary mediate between belligerents. A unique attribute of the peacekeeper's mission is the gathering and employment of intelligence within a different set of ethical guidelines, a product of the "peaceful" nature of the mission. To avoid infringing upon the privacy of the population, Kitson suggests the exploitation of open sources and the development of human contacts on both sides of the conflict. Despite the need to remain neutral, however, Kitson does relate experiences where forces intercepted communications, exposing again the need to deploy intelligence assets with the operational force.

Conclusion

Trinquier, Galula, and Kitson are certainly not the only authors providing useful insights into the nature and conduct of counterinsurgencies. They are, however, among the best sources of insight from a generation of soldiers with experience fighting modern wars. A number of common lessons or themes from the above discussion apply to the current situation in Iraq.