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Relearning counterinsurgency warfare
Parameters, Spring, 2004 by Robert R. Tomes
Intelligence tools, furthermore, must be attuned to geographic conditions, which remain a factor in the ability of the regime to defeat the insurgent. This is an area where US forces should be seeking out and applying new capabilities. Geospatial intelligence capabilities, including integration of demographic information, play an overriding role in insurgency warfare. Insurgents tend to use geography against the new government, including the exploitation of active borders to receive outside support.
A confluence of military and nonmilitary operations defeats the insurgent. This requires an organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements. This was, presumably, the goal of a recent US National Security Council decision to reorganize the management of Iraq operations. For Galula, counterinsurgency efforts require unified command, a single source of direction. This means a "tight" organization, to borrow from Trinquier, directing "the operation from the beginning to the end." (21) The military, moreover, cannot be allowed a free hand in the overall direction of the war. At the operational level, "It is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians." (22) That is, "military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population." (23)
Galula's discussion of command and control problems, which must be settled prior to engaging the enemy, exposes structural and conceptual elements of the counterinsurgency process. Once the decision to engage the enemy has been made and an area selected for operations, a systematic process is initiated in the first, and each consecutive, area where the insurgent is active. The first step involves selecting an area to win back from the enemy. Sufficient troops are massed in the area and moved into contact with the enemy in order to destroy or expel them. "This operation is not an end in itself, for guerrillas, like the heads of the legendary hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time. The real purpose of the operation," Galula continues, "is to prepare the stage for the further development of the counterinsurgent action." (24)
After an area has been cleared of guerrillas, the "over-all operation is finally broken down into several small-scale ones" and "all of the forces work on what is left of the guerrillas after the ... earlier sweeps." (25) This is predominantly a military activity. As such, there is likely to be some destruction of physical structures, crops, and damage to other local assets. As a result, the insurgent is likely to initiate a propaganda campaign using damaged assets as evidence that the government is unconcerned with, perhaps even antagonistic to, the local peasants or villagers. No easy solution exists for this problem. Preventative steps are concerned mainly with limiting the destruction and imposing constraints on the use of force. "Any damage done should be immediately compensated without red tape." (26)
