The carriers hold the line - aircraft carriers, Korean War - Brief Article

Naval Aviation News,  May, 2002  by John Reilly

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At this time Essex-class carriers operated fivesquadron air groups: two jet fighter squadrons flying Grumman F9F Panthers; two propeller fighter squadrons with Vought F4U Corsairs; and one propeller attack squadron with Douglas AD Skyraiders. To these complements were added small detachments of radarequipped night-flying F4Us and ADs, photoreconnaissance F4Us, and electronic countermeasures and airborne early warning ADs. Each carrier also had one or two Sikorsky HO3S helicopters for search-andrescue duty. While these could also do plane-guard work, destroyers still carried out much of that task.

The number of squadrons and detachments needed to support the rapid pace of combat missions made shipboard life chaotic in many ways. The three ready rooms on board the Essex-class carriers were overcrowded, so some squadrons had to use part of the wardroom as a ready room. Pairs of squadrons flying identical airplanes also caused problems because pilots flew the first plane of their type that became available, which was operationally convenient but diluted responsibility for the condition of the planes. In addition, separate spotting of planes by squadron added to the already burdensome tasks of flight deck crews.

Flight schedules were studied and adjusted to keep small strike groups, usually twelve F4Us and eight ADs, in the air for day-long target coverage. As ships and squadrons gained experience, launch and recovery times improved. Night operations were rotated between carriers to keep the burden on flight deck crews to a minimum. Admiral Joseph J. Clark, who commanded TF 77 and the Seventh Fleet during the Korean war, recalled the inadequacy of night air operations against the enemy. "Operation Insomnia involved small air raids...at night, but these tactics kept Air Department personnel on the carriers operating around the clock. I felt the effort did not justify the heavy burden on our crews, so I recommended that a special night carrier be equipped to handle the task [as had been done during WW II]. None was then available so night air operations were curtailed. This weakness gave the Communists almost a free hand at night; we were paying the price of the postwar demobilization that resulted in an understrength Navy."

Each carrier's endurance on station was affected by its capacity for aviation fuel, bunker oil and ammunition. As soon as the second carrier joined TF 77, each carrier spent two days on line and one day replenishing, working at night if necessary. When three carriers were available, two were kept on line while the third retired for rest and upkeep. Major Communist offensives called for continuous operations, consuming fuel and munitions at a rate that necessitated daily replenishment from late afternoon until around midnight. As with flight operations, experience led to more efficient delivery of fuel and ammunition, and the Seventh Fleet's underway replenishment group stayed continuously at sea and replenished as often as weather permitted.