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Improving Army marksmanship: regaining the initiative in the infantryman's hale kilometer
Infantry Magazine, July-August, 2006 by David Liwanag
General Wyman pointed out, however, that there would always be a need for extended-range precision rifle fire and a cadre of expert riflemen to give quality marksmanship instruction. The objectives of the Army marksmanship system, he explained, were to quickly and cheaply train large numbers of basic, effective combat marksmen, with units developing precision riflemen for combat and competition. Unit and Soldier mobility and dispersion dictated there would always be a need to cover gaps and terrain using designated squad riflemen (distinct from snipers) who could effectively shoot and kill targets at extended distances to 500 meters.
Infantry Soldiers were to receive Trainfire I in basic combat training. In infantry advanced individual training (AIT), they were to learn to fire as members of squads. Selected riflemen were to take a two-week Infantry School or Advanced Marksmanship Unit KD precision-shooting course, and all Soldiers were to be allowed the opportunity to compete in Army marksmanship events. The most advanced Soldiers would be selected for sniper training.
According to General Wyman, advanced KD and competition shooting were to remain an important part of marksmanship development and sustainment. The order implementing Trainfire I for CONARC units required that a minimum of 50 KD firing points (to 1,000 yards) per division, or equivalent, be maintained at each major installation.
Army marksmanship doctrine shifted to formally emphasize short-range volume fire over precision fire. Soldiers were taught to shoot at terrain and suspected enemy hiding places and firing positions--experience had proven it was easier to get amino resupplied than trained replacements. The Army transitioned from the 8-shot semiautomatic M1 to the 20-shot semiautomatic M14, then to the full-automatic-capable M 16.
Vietnam experience seemed to validate assumptions that most infantry engagements would be intense, short-range fights against indistinct targets. Theory suggested survival and success were linked to pure volume of fire. "Quickfire" point-shooting techniques without the use of sights appeared in the M16 marksmanship manuals, and were trained at Vietnam-specific training centers like Fort Polk using B-B rifles. Army marksmanship doctrine earned the nickname "spray and pray."
Vietnam manpower requirements demanded large numbers of riflemen from the institutional training base and the Army needed to train thousands of draftees quickly. KD and competition shooting were viewed as expensive and irrelevant for enhancing combat skills and survivability at jungle-engagement distances. FORSCOM and Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) deactivated their marksmanship training units (MTUs).
The current Trainfire rifle qualification course requires a recruit to hit 23 of 40 targets to meet Initial Entry Training standards (before 1980 this was 17 of 40). The expected norm is 27 to 31 hits. Fort Benning recently reported Initial Entry Training Soldiers averaged 27 hits of 40. The qualification score card in FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 Carbine, shows that to qualify a recruit does not have to hit all 200-meter targets, and can qualify while hitting no targets beyond 200 meters. Recruits are formally evaluated using only two shooting positions (prone and foxhole, supported and unsupported). Soldiers are not trained in sustained fire (being conditioned that a "hit" immediately eliminates a threat when the target goes down).
