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A clash of interests: will it be the national interest, or the interests of the 'international community'? This is a campaign question
National Review, April 5, 2004 by Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr.
PRESIDENTIAL elections are not, as a rule, decided by foreign-policy issues. But key foreign-policy issues can be decided by presidential elections, and this will be particularly true of 2004's. The differences between George W. Bush and John Kerry in their approaches to international relations could not be more dramatic. Never has the partisan gulf been wider. While in the past Democrats and Republicans frequently disagreed about individual issues--the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet arms control--at stake now is a fundamental operational principle: whether American foreign policy will be principally driven by considerations of the national interest or by a tender regard for the wishes of the "international community," based on an ideology of "multilateralism."
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Although the Left in general, and Democratic activists in particular, have ceaselessly carped about George W. Bush's "unilateralism," the president has actually followed a highly pragmatic approach to international cooperation, acting, whenever possible, in concert with other states and institutions--including Europe and the United Nations. In fact, on each of the major foreign-policy challenges it has faced, and continues to face--including war with al-Qaeda, deposing Saddam Hussein, interdicting WMDs and their components, and denuclearizing North Korea, Iran, and Libya--the administration has sought (and obtained) the support and assistance of numerous other countries and international organizations.
At the same time, Bush has eschewed improvident international commitments (such as the International Criminal Court Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol) that would tie America's hands in meeting the challenges of an increasingly dangerous world, compromise its sovereignty, and undermine its prosperity. Perhaps more to the point, the president has consistently treated multilateralism as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. This is the real complaint from Bush's critics, and they hate him for it--openly and unapologetically.
The religion of multilateralism began in post-World War II Europe, where the creation of multilateral Franco-German (and then "European") institutions was seen as the antidote to the nationalism that had sparked two world wars. The keystone of these efforts was the subordination of country-specific interests (particularly those of Germany) to the aspirations of a greater European community, de-legitimizing national action in the process. All this was so effective that, to this day, nascent unilateralism is one of the most serious charges that can be flung at a German politician, and even French officials routinely proclaim the overriding importance of common European interests in foreign affairs--rather than La Patrie or La Gloire. (Whether they believe what they say--the French foreign minister reportedly adorns his office with Napoleon Bonaparte's portrait--is another matter.)
Not surprisingly, France and Germany remain the "engines" of European integration, and, nearly 60 years later, the "common European home" has blossomed into a union that will soon stretch from Ireland to Poland. Together, Paris and Berlin--which secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld accurately characterized as "Old Europe"--seem determined to recreate something like the medieval Franco-German empire of Charlemagne. These new Carolingians have drafted a constitution (of which many of Europe's smaller states are understandably wary), and they are already flexing their ideological muscles. European politicians have set forth to preach the message that national sovereignty is anachronistic, if not positively dangerous, and that the "international community" is the ultimate font of legitimacy. Unfortunately, this message has been endorsed in the U.S. explicitly by senior Democratic officials, such as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, and indirectly by Democratic politicians--including John Kerry--who appear to consider "engagement" with the "international community" the lodestar of a successful foreign policy.
Why Old Europe's new learning should appeal to anybody in the United States is not immediately obvious: The U.S. has never indulged in the ethnically based nationalism that ravaged 20th-century Europe, instead cultivating a far more inclusive patriotism that, as George Will once noted, accepts anyone willing to subscribe to the principles announced in the Declaration of Independence. The first and foremost of those principles, of course, is the right to self-government, free from "supranational" interference.
Nevertheless, the Old World's thinking has always had a profound impact on the New, and especially on "progressive" opinion. While American conservatives tend to look to the British Enlightenment for their intellectual inspiration, the Left has traditionally found its ideas, and ideologies, in continental Europe--from Rousseau, to Marx, to Jean Jaures. This may explain why many American liberals, including a number of prominent Democratic leaders and foreign-policy experts, have so thoroughly embraced the European ideology of multilateralism. Yet this ideology is profoundly anti-democratic in nature, and irreconcilable with core American values such as self-government. The fact that it has been adopted by a self-styled populist party is astonishing.
