Jewish Social Ethics

THESE TWO VOLUMES EMBODY THE most mature and enduring statement of David Novak, American Judaism's most independent and urbane Traditionalist thinker. Novak's Traditionalist thought is grounded in, but not limited by, Judaism's halakhic tradition. He applies historical and philosophical methods in his address of contemporary social problems, and yet for all his urbanity, his thought is located within classical Jewish parameters, as he regularly espouses positions which will outrage the politically correct secular consensus. It is no accident that Novak's Jewish Social Ethics is accompanied by a wonderful monograph on Nahmanides (Ramban), for Ramban provides the classical model for his contemporary Jewish inquiry. Like his late revered teacher Abraham Joshua Heschel, Novak rejects what is taken to be the "pan-halakhic heresy," according to which all Jewish values must be quantified in Halakhah if they are to be considered to be normative.

Novak correctly and insightfully connects Nahmanides' comments concerning the Torah command "You shall be holy" (Lev. 19:1; Nahmanides ad loc.), that one might be a "wretch (naval) while conforming to the behavior the Torah permits (bi-reshut ha-Torah)," with the generic obligation that the Jew must always do "what is good and what is right (tov ve-yashar)" (Deut. 6:18; Nahmanides, ad loc.). According to Novak's reading of Nahmanides, "extra-self restraint, for the sake of God, can itself be a holy act." The sin of the Nazarite is not the rejection of the world, but the inevitable return to the impute world which had been rejected. According to this view, the Torah law, while necessary for the fulfillment of God's will, is not sufficient to accomplishing the task. Novak does not complete Nahmanides' comments to Leviticus 19:1, which remind the reader that one attains holiness "by removing oneself from impurity." Nahmanides, ever the zealous mystic, offers no explanation or defense of this assertion; it is "obvious" that staying away from impurity reflects God's plan for humankind. Similarly, God "loves what is good and what is right." The question, unanswered by both Nahmanides and Novak, is how one knows what is good and what is right, or how does one know that God desires that Israel remove itself from impurity.

For Novak, imitatio Dei "requires imaginative application in concrete, specific circumstances, of the general principles of justice and equality laid down in the Torah" (emphasis mine). For Novak (and Nahmanides), the "theology which finds reasons for God's commandments cannot view them as mere positive decrees." Following Heschel, Novak argues thai it is "proper intention ... that distinguishes authentic religious actions

from... religious behaviorism." While conceding that neither he nor Nahmanides is arguing that "holiness can be attained without observing the Torah," both argue that "the intention of holiness should lead one to do more than the letter of the law requires."

Novak regularly affirms the basic normativity of the law, even as he sees the letter of the law as a morally minimal limit. While one may argue with Novak's assigning of natural law to classical Judaism--and in Jewish Social Ethics, he concedes that the classical tradition has no term for the doctrine--his assignation of this doctrine to Nahmanides is not only justified, it represents his own theological position:

Nahmanides accepts the legitimacy of natural law on the interhuman level. But such morality and revelation are not located on the same plane. Morality comes from humans (at least in its most elemental manifestations). Revelation comes to them.

While "morality does not itself lead to revelation ... it is a precondition for it." The means, methods, and mind-set whereby Nahmanides and Novak determine divine intent, and the concerns which inform their filling the "gaps in the law," are markedly different. For Nahmanides, astrology is a natural science, the aggadic statements of the Talmud are not theologically binding, and human beings, through mysticism, can penetrate Judaism's higher truths. The acceptance of astrology, no less than the rejection of science, reflects the ideas of Nahmanides' age. For Nahmanides, God's opinions and needs reflect ultimate reality, while rabbinic authority may be challenged. Nahmanides is willing to challenge the opinions of rabbinic sages; he claims that God does have needs, and theology determines what ultimate divine intent really is.

The locus classicus for this problem is the Maimonidean claim that one is required to believe in God's existence by Torah law, whereas for Nahmanides, this belief is a condition rather than a requirement of the law. Novak appropriately calls attention to the statement in B. Makkot 23b-24a, which lists belief in God a commandment, and defends the Nahmanidean (as well as his own) demurral with the fact that Hasdai ibn Crescas and Joseph Albo also believe that law and theology must not be confused. Implied in this citation is the assertion that because medieval scholars disagreed, there is a legitimate difference of opinion. According to the Talmud, the command to believe is a command. By arguing that since this command is theological, and not legal, it cannot be a command, one lights on the conundrum cited above, in which, in addition to following the positive laws of the Torah, there are criteria for religious normativity that are not explicit in the law.