Why organic fires?

Infantry Magazine,  May-June, 2004  by Robert F. Barry, II

• E-mail
• Print
• Link

The Army's purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars, according to the Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023." As the source of trained and ready land forces of decisive action across the spectrum of conflict, the Army provides the joint force commander (JFC) the ability to coerce enemies, control resources and populations, and decisively conclude conflicts on terms and a timeline favorable to U.S. national interests.

If we believe war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will, then to win our nation's wars, we must leave the enemy no choice but to accede to our demands. By persistent close combat and, if necessary, occupation of the enemy's territory and key facilities, ground forces compel him to accede.

The enemy must face a persistent state of disadvantage, and friendly ground forces must be able to escalate the disadvantages of his continued resistance quickly. Responsive, adjustable, scalable and precise fire support is a key enabler in creating persistent disadvantage. These adjectives describe fires organic to the ground force.

Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines "organic" as "assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization." Building on that definition, for purposes of this article, "organic" refers to maintaining a balance of indirect fires assets as part of the ground force, in general, to preclude the force from having to rely too heavily on other joint fires assets that cannot provide the required responsiveness, force protection or variety of effects that organic assets can. There also have been discussions about field artillery's being "organic," or under the command and control of, say, a maneuver brigade--organizationally, much the same as the howitzer battery in each squadron of an armored cavalry regiment.

This article focuses on the joint balancing of fires assets organic to the ground force and leaves the other Army debate about the actual organization and command and control of those assets within the ground force to another article.

For the foreseeable future, only mortars, cannons, and rockets organized and distributed on the battlefield along side maneuver forces can provide ground commanders responsive, all-weather, 24/7 fire support to close with and destroy the enemy. Organic fire support assets allow the ground force commander to synchronize his fires with his maneuver to destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy forces before contact or during the fight. This enabling relationship between ground-based fires and maneuver speeds the destruction of enemy forces and preserves friendly combat power.

The compelling nature of close combat is a keystone of U.S. Army doctrine. According to Field Manual 3.0, Operations, close combat has but one purpose: "to decide the outcome of battles and engagements." Defeating or destroying enemy forces and seizing terrain are what decide the outcome of battles--fire and maneuver. The Army leadership historically has recognized the absolute necessity for ground force commanders to have responsive artillery fires available to them--as integral to their success--and task organized or mission tailored the force to ensure those fires were available.

The Debate: Organic Fires or Not

Today many are debating whether or not commanders need organic fire support assets. Much of this debate is fueled by the success of and continued improvements in technology, which leads some to point out the tremendous savings in resources that could be garnered by reducing what some consider to be redundant fires assets.

Some argue that because technology is providing precise intelligence, targeting and weapons, we don't need the area fire capabilities and the variety of ammunition effects that organic cannon and rocket artillery bring to the fight. They argue that precision will give us surgical one-shot/ one-kill capabilities with target location so precise and situational awareness (SA) so complete that suppression won't be necessary.

They also argue that responsiveness, typically a strength of organic artillery, will be irrelevant because the joint fires network will allow all sensors equal access to all shooters. Their logic is that responsiveness is not a function of what indirect fires at each echelon bring to the fight, but rather a function of the network and the availability of joint assets. The logic continues that, because we always will be able to achieve air superiority, a large portion of these joint fires assets can be air platforms, reducing the need for organic indirect fire assets in the ground force. Those assets that the ground force retains might be something akin to the non-line-of sight-launcher system (NLOS-LS) because the force won't need area fires.

The argument goes that, surely, improvements in command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) give commanders such unprecedented access to information and sophisticated synchronization capabilities that they virtually are assured of dominating any battlefield without organic fires.