Google says it has disrupted what it believes to be the world’s largest residential proxy operation, cutting off a sprawling, hidden network that quietly turned everyday Android phones, PCs, and smart devices into rented internet relays. Acting on a US federal court order, the company targeted domains and backend systems linked to a China-based firm known as Ipidea, and removed hundreds of related apps from its ecosystem.
The Wall Street Journal reports that roughly nine million Android devices were swept into the network at its peak. By routing strangers’ traffic through unwitting users’ IP addresses, the operation masked the true origin of everything from aggressive scraping to more serious abuse, leaving victims with the risk and none of the reward.
- What a residential proxy network does and why it matters
- How the scheme infiltrated apps through bundled SDKs
- From proxies to botnets: the rise of the Kimwolf DDoS
- Legal takedown and industry context for Ipidea network
- What Android users should do now to reduce proxy risks
- The bigger security picture and shifting threat economics

What a residential proxy network does and why it matters
Residential proxy services sell access to real consumer internet connections. To a website, traffic appears to come from a normal home user rather than a data center, which makes it far harder to block. That makes proxies valuable for certain legitimate tasks like ad verification or localized testing. It also makes them catnip for bad actors who want to blend in while automating scalping, credential stuffing, spam, or other illicit activity.
In plain terms, it’s like someone else briefly “borrowing” your home IP address without you realizing. Your connection does the heavy lifting, while the operator monetizes the access. If the activity crosses legal or ethical lines, the trail can lead back to you.
How the scheme infiltrated apps through bundled SDKs
According to Google’s security team, Ipidea’s software reached devices through developer kits bundled into free mobile apps, games, and desktop tools. The incentive was simple: SDK partners got paid per install. Once embedded, the SDK could convert a device into an exit node for the proxy network while the app appeared to function normally.
Google says Play Protect now flags and removes apps that include Ipidea-linked components and blocks new installs containing the SDK. That matters because SDKs are a classic supply-chain blind spot: a clean app can become a liability if a third-party library turns shady. Google has been pushing developers toward vetted libraries via initiatives like the Play SDK Index, but monetization schemes still tempt some app makers to look the other way.
From proxies to botnets: the rise of the Kimwolf DDoS
Security researchers previously uncovered a flaw impacting devices tied to the proxy network that allowed attackers to hijack at least two million systems, amassing a botnet dubbed Kimwolf. The network pummeled targets with enormous distributed denial-of-service attacks. Researchers tracking the waves of traffic described Kimwolf as among the most powerful botnets observed, a stark illustration of what happens when residential proxies collide with exploitation.
Beyond outages and fraud, the risks compound at scale. Residential IP space is embedded in homes, schools, small businesses, and even critical industries. When abused, it frustrates defenders and raises concerns that spill into consumer protection and national security realms.

Legal takedown and industry context for Ipidea network
The court order let Google move beyond app store enforcement to disrupt the network’s control layer, targeting dozens of websites and backend services tied to Ipidea. While technical takedowns rarely eliminate every node, they drive up costs for operators and sever large chunks of their infrastructure, forcing rebuilds and reducing harm in the interim.
Ipidea has stated it opposes illegal use and says its services are meant for legitimate business customers, acknowledging it previously used “aggressive” marketing, including outreach on hacker forums, which it claims has stopped. However, Google and independent researchers argue the scale of covert enrollment and the documented abuse tipped the balance decisively toward intervention.
What Android users should do now to reduce proxy risks
Ensure Google Play Protect is enabled and up to date. Open the Play Store, check Play Protect settings, and run a scan. If Play Protect flags an app tied to proxy behavior, remove it immediately.
Audit your apps with a skeptical eye. Uninstall titles you don’t recognize or no longer use, especially free utilities or games that request broad permissions or run constantly in the background. Review app data usage and battery stats for unexpected spikes, a common tell for hidden networking.
Avoid sideloading from unknown sources and disable the Install Unknown Apps permission unless it’s essential. Keep Android and Play Services updated, and periodically reset your advertising ID. If an app resists removal, check whether it has device admin privileges and revoke them before uninstalling.
The bigger security picture and shifting threat economics
This episode underscores a broader shift in cybercrime toward abusing residential IP space and SDK supply chains. Content delivery and security companies have reported record DDoS volumes amplified by traffic flowing through compromised or monetized household connections. Meanwhile, platform providers continue to block millions of policy-violating app submissions, but the long tail of third-party SDKs remains a persistent weak point.
The takedown of Ipidea-linked infrastructure will not end proxy abuse, but it resets the economics and sends a clear signal: covert conscription of consumer devices is not just a policy violation, it’s a legal and technical hazard that platforms, researchers, and courts are increasingly willing to tackle head-on.
