PLAUSIBILITY OF PANENTHEISM, THE

Encounter, Summer 2006 by Towne, Edgar A

<< Page 1 Continued from page 9. Previous | Next

A Sustainable Theism and Critical Inquiry

Most Popular: 5 Super Tips To Get Rid Of Your Public Speaking Fear: How To Overcome Public Speaking Anxiety; 3 Questions No Job Seeker Ever Wants To Be Asked?; 13 Job Interview Mistakes To Avoid; Forecasting With Excel: Suggestions For Managers; How To Get Things Done: A Guide To Strategic Planning

These brief concluding remarks about a method of inquiry into the meaning of claims made by believers who speak of God and gods, Goddess and goddesses, and into the truth of these claims, are, as might be expected, suggested by the views Hartshorne has expressed about God. Throughout his life he has pursued his own inquiry into theism in such a way that the question has not been begged but rather kept open. Hartshorne may be thought to have begged the question when he adopts Anselm's proposal that God is to be conceived to be a being so great that none greater can be conceived, namely, a being (an actuality) who cannot be conceived not to exist. I suggest he has not begged the question when he argues, in effect, that to think of God as possibly not existing as actual is not to have conceived of God at all. For this has not proved God's existence, as Hartshorne has granted, even in the form of the ontological argument. What this does is provide an understanding of God that can be a benchmark in the debate about theism. On one hand, it respects the claims of theists of all kinds without special pleading in behalf of any particular kind. Hartshorne's theism is one among many kinds. No theist can espouse theism in general. Every theist must espouse a specific theism, one in which God is named and described. On the other hand, Hartshorne's theism respects the claims of nontheists of all kinds because their arguments are dependent upon the kinds of theism they deny, the names and descriptions involved in them. Not every theist or nontheist may be capable of giving an account of the type of theism she accepts or rejects, but analysis can disclose the types involved and a critique can be made.

Hartshorne has discussed the word "God" as a name and has provided a description. The description is called by various terms: "dipolarity," "transcendent relativity," and "dual transcendence." The description identifies God as necessarily existing in some actual world, though not necessarily in this world, which is contingent. This is the strict identity of God. This is the ontic status of God as actual. In the course of evolution some human beings have adopted god-talk, Hartshorne would contend, on the ontological basis of their intuition of God in the cosmic and terrestrial processes.58 So as a matter of meaning, his idea is coherent with the fact that human beings have intuited, in their several ways, the divinity of the universe. God has a second type of ontic status as actual in this god-talk by which God, with some description or other, is intentionally named as "God." This is the use by believers, or mention by believers and nonbelievers, of the divine name with whatever description that may or may not be in their minds. Both name and description are required if any actuality of God is to be specified. With Hartshorne's benchmark description in place, itself able to be criticized, theistic inquiry can proceed to subject all theistic descriptions-employed both in affirmation and in denial-to critical inquiry. In such a way, inquiry into theism becomes an ongoing and open-ended process.

Featured White Papers

PLAUSIBILITY OF PANENTHEISM, THE

Encounter, Summer 2006 by Towne, Edgar A

Find Research Guides for:

Find Featured Titles for: Reference

Most Popular Articles in Reference

Most Popular Publications in Reference